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This study examines the different approaches to foreign aid by Norway and China. Through a 
historical timeline the Chinese and Norwegian foreign aid is unfolded and examined. Since 
the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2006, China‟s foreign aid 
has been the focus of international attention. China is seen as challenging the Western aid 
architecture with its different approaches to delivering foreign aid; especially with weaving 
aid, trade and investment together to create sustainability in foreign aid projects. 
This thesis will aim to contribute to, by means of a historical comparative of Norwegian and
Chinese foreign aid; increase the understanding of Norwegian and Chinese foreign aid 
approaches in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The study examines Norwegian and Chinese
foreign aid approaches by looking at how they have evolved in a complex donor
environment, multilateral agencies and foreign and national NGOs. The study asks the 
question of whether Norway has any claim or right to expect recipient countries citizens and 
elected officials, to conform to the values and democratic traditions of the donor country. Is it
legitimate for Norway to use its foreign aid as a condition to promote values such as human
rights, democracy and equality?
The study will illustrate that conditionality and non-conditionality in foreign aid delivery, is 
still a subject that is fraught with controversy. Conditionality is still a widely used tool by
different actors in the Western aid architecture, especially making aid conditional on political
policies (human rights and democratisations) of recipient countries. The study will compare
Norwegian and Chinese use of conditionality and rhetoric of unconditionality. China‟s
unconditionality using Zimbabwe as a short case study, where China has drawn criticism for
prolonging Mugabe‟s dictatorial rule.
The study will further illustrate Norway's behaviour analysed using the game theory model
called “Samaritan‟s dilemma”, which highlights a welfare state such as Norway foreign aid 
behaviour vis-à-vis their recipients and recipient‟s negotiation power; where the dominant 
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Background, Aim and Method 
 
1.1 Background – A Changing Aid Architecture  
The two-day Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in November 2006 
began what has become an unprecedented focus on China‟s role in Africa. China‟s foreign 
aid has since been methodically covered, b 
ut there remains a need for further study of this emerging phenomenon, especially at the 
comparative level. China is leading the group of emerging countries making up the BRICS 
nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). These are a collection of countries 
that have seen rapid economic expansion in the last thirty years. Provoking a fundamental 
shift in the global economic power balance is China, currently the world‟s second largest 
economy, according to Robert Fogel in 2040 the Chinese “economy will reach $ 123 trillion, 
or nearly three times the economic output of the entire globe in 2000.”
1
 A study from 
Carnegie Endowment is less optimistic and predicts that in a thirty years‟ time China will 
overtake United States
2
 as the largest economy.
3
 Furthermore, China is challenging existing 
models of foreign aid. Wolfgang Fengler argues that at the core, Western foreign aid has 
changed little since the 1950‟s,
4
 but that “new pressures on the aid systems may be too strong 
to resist fundamental change”.
5
 New players such as China are especially creating this new 
pressure in the system, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  
Despite a few countries providing the target of ODA percentage of 0.7% of GNI, foreign aid 
still constitutes an important part of international economy of the last 50 years, representing 
the largest form of resource transfer from developed to developing countries, greater than 
                                                          
1
 Robert Fogel, ‘Why China’s Economy Will Grow to $123 Trillion by 2040’, Foreign Policy, 2010 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/123000000000000?wp_login_redirect=0> [accessed 5 
February 2013]. 
2
 Currently China is on-fourth of America’s commercial GDP. In 2007 China’s GDP was at $3 trillion compared 
with $ 14trillion of United States.  
3
 Albert Keidel, China’s Ecomonomic Rise - Fact and Fiction, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 
2008, p. 16. 
4
 Wolfgang Fengler, ‘Delivering Aid Differently – The New Reality of Aid | End Poverty’, blogs.worldbank.org 


















both foreign direct investment and commercial loans.
6
 This highlights the importance of aid 
and the impact it has on developing country economy, and more specifically how the type of 
aid has varying consequences. According to EllingTjønneland, “China‟s development will 




Norway continues to be one of the major providers of foreign aid, going above the 0.7 Gross 
National Income (GNI) target set by the United Nations.
8
 Since the mid 1990‟s, Norway‟s 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNI has ranged from 0.8 to 
1.10% GNI (see table). 
 Source: OECD/DAC/Norad 
In 2010, total Norwegian foreign aid totalled USD 4,742 billion. Of this USD 981 million 
went to Africa, the largest regional recipient. In recent years, despite limited official statistics 
about the amount China is spending on foreign aid, researchers place China as a medium size 
foreign aid provider similar to that of Belgium or Canada.
9
  
The characteristics of China‟s aid policy share similarities with the foreign aid policy laid out 
by former President Harry S. Truman. In his 1949 inaugural address, Truman set out to 
combine technical assistance and capital investment in an effort to increase industrial activity 
and production. Truman said “greater production is the key to prosperity and peace…and the 
key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and 
                                                          
6
Jarle Simensen, ‘Writing the History of Development Aid’, Scandinavian Journal of History, 32 (2007), p. 167. 
7
EN Tjønneland and others, China in Africa. Implications for Norwegian Foreign and Development Policies 
(Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2006), p. 84. 
8
‘Official Development Assistance ’ <http://iif.un.org/content/official-development-assistance> [accessed 30 
January 2013]. 
9
 Sven Grimm and others, ‘Transparency of Chinese Aid: An Analysis of the Published Information on Chinese 


















 An underlying premise of this policy was to assist in the fight against 
communism. However the underlying premise of China‟s aid policy remains unclear to 
Western researchers. Whether it seeks to counter Western influence and garner support from 
the developing countries, access to natural resources or whether the intention is purely to 
assist in SSA development remains unclear. The topic resource extraction has generated 
much literature coverage, many claiming China‟s primary motivating generator for its foreign 
aid and presence in Africa is natural resources, though this is not evidence based.
11
 While the 
subject of Chinese influence on good governance of the recipient countries have received less 
academic research. 





 Throughout the history of aid, various kinds of conditions both unambiguous and 
discreet have been accompanying aid.
14
 Conditionality is seen as one of the key 
distinguishing points between Norwegian and Chinese foreign aid. According to Olav 
Stokke, the political conditionality objective has “been to promote democratic reform, human 
rights and administrative accountability in the South.”
15
 China, on the other hand, promotes 
non-conditionality in its foreign aid, adhering to the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other nations. But is charged by critics that its non-conditionality is helping 
rogue regimes and dictators stay in power.
16
 Norway has stated in its Soria Moria declaration 
(2005)
17
 to abstain from economic and political conditionality but has had difficulty in letting 
go of all political and economic conditionality to the aid when recipients of foreign aid 
violates human rights and democratic institutions.  
                                                          
10
 Harry S. Truman, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1949. 
11
Obert Hodzi, Leon Hartwell and Nicola De Jager, ‘“Unconditional Aid”: Assessing the Impact of China’s 
Development Assistance to Zimbabwe’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 19 (2012), 79–103; Leni 
Wild and David Mepham, ‘The New Sinosphere: China in Africa’, Institute for Public Policy Resarch, 2006, 80; 
Tjønneland and others, p. 84. 
12
 This is in many times also described as ‘no-strings attached’ is literature, it is also used interchangeably 
leading to some confusion on what it really entails. ‘no-strings-attached’ is in this paper seen as too broad, and 
I will use the wording unconditional and unconditionality since it is seen as more precise to the subject I am 
dealing with.   
13
Tjønneland and others, pp. 31-32. 
14
Olav Stokke, Aid and Political Conditionality, ed. by Olav Stokke (London: Frank Cass in association with EADI, 
1995), p. 1. 
15
Stokke, p. 1. 
16
Obert Hodzi, Leon Hartwell and Nicola De Jager, ‘“Unconditional Aid”: Assessing the Impact of China’s 
Development Assistance to Zimbabwe’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 19 (2012), pp. 79–103. 
17
The Office of the Prime Minister, ‘The Soria Moria Declaration on International Policy’ (regjeringen.no, 2007) 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/smk/documents/Reports-and-action-plans/rapporter/2005/The-Soria-















A historically comparative approach to unravel contemporary relations of Chinese and 




1.2 Problem Statement  
China is challenging the Western aid architecture with a different approach to delivery of aid, 
weaving aid, trade and investment closer together
19
, making it problematic to clearly compare 
Chinese foreign aid to a classical Western foreign aid model.  
China is challenging traditional aid approaches by providing unconditional funding that is at 
some instances linked with trade priorities; this may be a problem because it could pose a 
threat to human rights and democratic institutions in SSA. Further, China‟s One China policy 
is political conditionality, where aid is conditional that countries do not recognise Taiwan. 
This raises the problematic issue of where to draw the line of non-interference in another 
countries internal affair when human rights and democratic freedoms are threatened. China‟s 
unconditional foreign aid policy is challenging scholars and policymakers alike to revisit 
entrenched models of conditionality involving the promotion of good governance and 
democratic values, as pursued by Norway. Should countries only wait until the UN Charter 
authorizes the Security Council
20
 to impose sanctions only in circumstances that threaten 
international security?  
1.3 Research Questions  
The aim of this study is to provide a comparison of Norwegian and Chinese foreign aid to 
Sub-Saharan Africa, focusing in particular on conditionality. This will be done by: 
 providing an overview of the history and development of Norwegian and Chinese aid 
policy and its implementation in Sub-Saharan Africa; 
 comparing the use of conditionality by Norway and China‟s „no-strings-attached‟ 
policy; 
                                                          
18
 D. Large, ‘Beyond “Dragon in the Bush”: The Study of China Africa Relations’, African Affairs, 107 (2007), p. 
48. 
19
 This is true for Angola and DRC, in other countries, aid, trade and investment is not always the case, and 
Chinese foreign aid may be structured differently.  
20
 ‘Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the 
















 exploring the implications and dilemmas of conditionality versus non-conditionality. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
A comparative case study method is used to create a clearer picture and add strength to the 
research of two complex and different foreign aid actors.
21
 This is an inductive, qualitative 
research inquiry, utilising country case studies of China and Norway to compare and contrast 
the historical experiences with foreign aid by the two countries. The two countries have been 
selected due to the fact that they represent the two poles of the current aid architecture. 
Norway is one of the few countries giving above 0.7% of GNI, representing the ideal 
Western donor. China on the other hand is challenging the Western aid architecture by 
providing aid unconditionally and weaving aid, trade and investment closer.  
The qualitative study provides in-depth information of the context of the situation, giving it 
more scope for rich analysis and interpretation. 
This paper primarily uses secondary sources for the academic analysis; including academic 
literature, official statements, official documents and other written sources. No primary 
sources were used.      
1.5 Limitations  
Except for the usual limitation of time and length of the dissertation, a factor complicating 
this comparison is the different standards in defining official development assistance (ODA). 
China's interpretation of ODA is different to Norway's. For example, China includes military 
assistance under its general development assistance, while Norway does not. This highlights 
the fact that after nearly 60 years of foreign aid, there is still no accepted definition by all 
actors of the world aid architecture.  
Another limitation to the study is language and corresponding access to information. Most 
information on Chinese development assistance is in Mandarin which forces the author to 
rely on translations and analysis by other researches.  
1.6 Chapter Outline 
The rest of the thesis will be organised as follows:     
Chapter 2 Chinese Aid into Sub-Saharan Africa 
Chapter two provides a history and development of Chinese aid in SSA. The chapter will 
assist in clarifying what the Chinese government defines as foreign aid and why that clashes 
with the Western ODA definition. 
Chapter 3 Norwegian Aid into Sub-Saharan Africa 
                                                          
21
















Chapter Three will follow the same structure as chapter two, providing an overview of the 
history and development of Norwegian aid. The Norwegian experience will be explored as 
part of the traditional aid architecture and the Bretton Woods institutions.
22
 
Chapter 4 Comparative Analysis of Conditionality  
The fourth chapter is structured along comparative lines, providing a historical introduction 
of the use of conditionality by Norway and China‟s „no-strings-attached‟ approach. It will 
also consider the implications and dilemmas of conditionality versus non-conditionality.   
Chapter 5 Conclusion and Final Remarks 
The final chapter will summarise the overall research findings. . Drawing from the empirical 
work, this chapter concludes that though China and Norway are at the two polar positions of 
the aid architecture, their main goals are similar, in particular their wish to alleviate poverty 
in SSA. Norway‟s aid strategy has been changing in line with the rest of the Western aid 
architecture, while China‟s foreign aid strategy has remained relatively unchanged in 
comparison to Norway, adapting from their own experience as formerly a recipient of aid to 
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Chinese Aid into Sub-Saharan Africa 
2.1 Introduction  
China‟s interests in Africa have grown dramatically over the past thirty years. There is much 
curiosity and a sense of fear about the extent of China‟s influence in Africa. Most notably, 
after a two-day Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 
November 2006, with delegations from forty-eight African states attending.
23
 This event was 
significant in that it sparked a keen sense of interest from the other actors in the aid 
architecure, who started paying closer attention to the effects of China's prevalent agenda on 
African countries development. According to Daniela Large, the attention was 
unprecedented; with Western governments, Non-Governmental Organisations and Think-
tanks all surprised at how this “new Wind from the East is blowing across Africa.”
24
 
China has been providing aid to the African continent since the African states gained their 
independence. The pace and size of Chinese aid rapidly increased from 2004 to 2009, an 
increase of almost 29 per cent; according to the Chinese White Paper on their foreign aid. 
This, according to the Chinese government, coincides with China‟s “sustained and rapid 
economic growth and enhanced overall national strength”.
25
The phenomenon of the rise non-
DAC donors is, according to Soyeun Kim and Simon Lightfoot, giving rise to challenges, 
questions and opportunities with their increasing "direct and indirect influences in the global 
south…to the traditional DAC donors as well as for the international aid institutions and 
regimes”.
26
While as Sven Grimm notes that “these new actors in international development 
have tended to be marginal to international id policy debates thus far dominated by members 
of the OECD-DAC”
27
 we may see in the future see these actors challenge the aid debate. 
There is still a lot of misunderstanding about China‟s aid prerogatives. This is for the most 
part China‟s own fault, after decades of being non-transparent about its aid agenda. Also to 
blame are journalists and academics who have not taken the time to analyse and understand 
the differences in aid practices and how China itself defines its aid - which falls outside the 
„traditional‟ aid definition of OECD DAC. 
                                                          
23
Luan Shanglin, ‘President Hu: Wide-ranging Consensus Reached During Beijing Summit’, chinanews, 2006 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/05/content_5293311.htm> [accessed 8 May 2012].Yan 
Zhonghua, ‘Declaration of the Beijing Summit Of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (Draft)’, Chinanews 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/16/content_5336745.htm> [accessed 8 May 2012]. 
24
John K Cooley, East Wind over Africa;: Red China’s African Offensive (New York: Walker and Company, 1965), 
p. 3. 
25
 State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2011, “White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid” 
26
Soyeun Kim and Simon Lightfoot, ‘Policy Arena Does “ Dac ‐ Ability ” Really Matter ? the Emergence of Non ‐ 
Dac Donors : Introduction to Policy Arena’, Journal of International Development, (2011), pp. 711-712. 
27
Sven Grimm and others, ‘Transparency of Chinese Aid: An Analysis of the Published Information on Chinese 
















President Hu Jintao proposed at the FOCAC in 2006 to implement a new “strategic 
partnership” based on “political equality, mutual trust, economic cooperation, win-win, and 
cultural exchanges"
28
- including, amongst other things pledging to double its aid into 
Africa.
29
 This sparked both fear and wonder of China's involvement in Africa. Numerous 
think-tanks, books and articles continue to propagate information which is generally not 
based on solid evidence; but rather on myths. This paper hopes to clear some of these 
misconceptions. 
According to the literature, the overall aim of foreign aid is for the contributor to alleviate the 
situation in some form or another, in the country to which it is supplying assistance. Aid in 
itself can take several forms. Most commonly it comes as the allocation of goods, services 
and funds from one country to another. Tracking the history of foreign aid, the earliest types 
used to be in the form of military and food assistance. The most famous and successful aid 
programme was the post-war aid programme for Europe, generally known as the Marshall 
Plan. This model would set the scene for the creation of what would become the OECD.
30
 
Interestingly, China‟s own experience as receiver of foreign aid from Japan and Europe, led it 
to pick the parts it saw fitting to shape their own construct of aid. It is fascinating to note that 
today other nations are looking at China for inspiration, searching for an alternative to the 
Western architecture of aid. One can argue that China can better draw lessons from their own 
experience as a developing country, which was earlier a recipient of Japanese and Western 
aid; to make it a more competent deliverer of development assistance, and with far less 
political baggage. 
2.2 Defining Chinese Aid 
Painting a clear picture of Chinese foreign aid to sub-Saharan Africa and any other part of the 
world is difficult, especially when dissecting Chinese aid. We try to do this by giving a brief 
history of Chinese aid in the part below. Until of late, China viewed its development 
assistance statistics as a matter of 'state secret'. With the publication of their White Paper on 
foreign aid in 2011, one starts to get a better picture although it is still difficult get a clear 
understanding of Chinese foreign aid architecture due to the lack of transparency and their 
different outlook of what foreign aid entails. Even though the bulk of Chinese foreign aid 
cannot be defined along the lines of the OECD Development Assistance Committee‟s 
definition of aid, it can be categorised under other official flows (OOF) – these are funds 
from governments but do not qualify as ODA according to the OECD-DAC. For China OOF 
are mainly preferential/commercial export credits which represent 97 per cent of China‟s 
Eximbank development funding. The main characteristic of China's export credits are tied to 
Chinese companies and are used as a tool to increase exports. Brautigam argues that these 
OOF could be seen as a nominal part of the aid architecture, fulfilling the role of promoting 
                                                          
28
Luan Shanglin, ‘President Hu: Wide-ranging Consensus Reached During Beijing Summit’, Xinhua, 2006 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-11/05/content_5293311.htm> [accessed 15 May 2012]. 
29
Brautigam, p. 1. 
30
‘OECD History’ <http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761863_1_1_1_1_1,00.html> 















welfare and economic development.
31
 With the release of the White Paper on Chinese aid, 
China has relaxed in its stance on the semantics of aid, moving away from its strict use of the 
term „external assistance‟ instead of „aid‟ to define its foreign aid.
32
 This as we will cover in 
detail does not entail that China is going to abide by the OECD-DAC terminology or 
transparency of foreign aid any time soon.  
What defines Chinese aid is grounded in its experience as a recipient of aid and its own 
development of being a foreign aid provider. The historical foundation of this will be further 
explored in the latter part of this chapter. Set in the 1950s, the foreign policy framework of 
China‟s aid to other countries included principles of equality; mutual respect of each other‟s 
sovereignty and „no-strings-attached‟. Giving depth to these principles were the “four 
principles on Sino-African Economic and Technical Co-operation”
 33
  which were launched 
by Premier Ziyang in 1983. These are relevant to how China defines its aid.  
As China is not an OECD-DAC member, it does not have to abide by the OEDC-ODA 
definition.
34
 China does not describe its aid as 'official' development assistance. It merely 
calls it aid, mostly to differentiate itself from OECD-DAC and the Bretton Woods 
institutions. In comparison to OECD members, China does not need to abide by the OECD‟s 
Working Group on Regulations covering Export Credits and Other Official Flows (OOF). In 
comparison to the OECD members where the OOF is substantially smaller than the ODA, 
China‟s OOF makes up the bulk of China‟s government-provided finance to Africa. This 
according to Brautigam, is especially true for investment and funds coming from the two 
policy banks of China, Eximbank (export credit agency) and China Development Bank.
35
 
China does not view preferential export buyer‟s credits as aid, only concessional loans.  
According to OECD-DAC, grants automatically falls under ODA, while loans needs to be 
below-market interest rates and a long grace periods. This "is concessional in character and 
conveys a grant element
36
 of at least 25% (calculated at a discount rate of 10 per cent.)”
37
 
                                                          
31
 Deborah Brautigam, ‘China in Africa: The Real Story: The Chinese in Africa: The Economist Gets Some Things 
Right, Some Wrong’ <http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2011/05/chinese-in-africa-economist-gets-
some.html#comment-form> *accessed 9 May 2012+; Deborah Bräutigam, ‘China , Africa and the International 
Aid Architecture’, 2010, p. 6. 
32
 Grimm and others, p. 4. 
33
 Brautigam, p. 24. 
34
 The agreed upon standardised definition of the DAC members was coined in 1972 a little over a decade after 
the creation of the OECD and DAC. It states “concessional funding given to developing countries (those with a 
per capita income below a regularly adjusted threshold) and to multilateral institutions primarily for the 





 Deborah Brautigam, ‘Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why, and How Much?’, in Rising 
China: Global Challenges and Opportunities, ed. by Jane Golley, Ligang Song (Australia National University 
Press, 2011), pp. 204–205. 
36
In essence grant element measures the concessionality of a loan. According to the OECD the grant element 
reflects the “financial terms of a commitment: interest rate, maturity and grace period (interval to first 
repayment of capital). It measures the concessionality of a loan, expressed as the percentage by which the 
present value of the expected stream of repayments falls short of the repayments that would have been 
generated at a given reference rate of interest.” Chinese aid grant in itself are usually connected to small to 
















This entails that the loan needs to be 25 per cent below that of a commercial loan over time. 
Thus part of the loan has a grant element to it. OOF loans for private investment, even if they 
qualify in accordance with the grant element, would never be defined as ODA. As well, 
China considers military aid as part of its general aid, something OECD-DAC does not 
necessarily view as ODA.
38
 Further complicating the picture is the fact that Eximbank raises 
some of its capital from the markets. A concessional loan would be larger than what aid 
figures would show since the “Ministry of Finance only include its budget what it pays 
Eximbank for the interest rate subsidy.”
39
  
What China seems to deviate from are the different approaches to aid delivery and the 
content of such aid. From its own experience, China finds infrastructure development to be 
one of the most efficient ways of assisting to support the development in the recipient 
country. After a project is finished, Chinese managers and technicians will stay on making 
sure the project is running efficiently. Until 1961, the World Bank itself was heavily involved 
in infrastructure; 75 per cent of the World Bank‟s loans financed transportation and 
electricity projects.
40
 It is only recently that the OECD members have started re-thinking 
infrastructure; this after seeing Chinese engagement in this sector.
41
 By looking at China's 
foreign aid through a historical lens, one can start to see the several transformative stages that 
they have gone through. The four main transformation stages will be dealt with below. 
2.3 Early Stage (1956-1978) 
The start of Chinese aid into Africa came about the year after the Asian-African Conference 
in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. This convening was attended by 29 Asian and African 
countries, who met “to confront colonialism and the divisive nature of the Cold War.”
42
 
Egypt was the first African country to receive aid from China in 1956; signifying the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
43
 The first country in sub-
Saharan Africa was Guinea, where China built a cigarette and match factory. China‟s aid 
programme in Africa only really took off after the disastrous Great Leap Forward (1958-
60).
44
 The main „target‟ of Chinese aid during this time was newly independent African 
countries, which they found had similarities to their own country. With the Western aid 
architecture moving away from production and infrastructure towards poverty, essential 
needs and direct rural development; China kept their aid structure - stressing aid as a tool for 
helping countries to be self-reliant. One should keep in mind that Mainland China became 
isolated after World War II and its communist revolution. China was further isolated after 
Mao‟s break with the Soviet Union in 1959 and in July 1963 the last attempt to salvage the 
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 Is It ODA? <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf>. 
38
 Grimm and others, p. 4. 
39
 Brautigam, p. 167. 
40
 Anne O Krueger, Constantine Michalopoulos and Vernon W Ruttan, Aid and Development (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Univ Press, 1989), p. 125. 
41
 Brautigam, p. 134. 
42
 Ampiah and Naidu, p. 6. 
43
 Deborah Bräutigam, ‘China , Africa and the International Aid Architecture’, 2010, p. 7. 
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 The Sino-Soviet alliance would gradually disintegrate with the 
ideological dilemmas playing according to Mingjiang Li a leading role, with the leaders of 
the respective countries viewing the “ideological and political orientation of the other country 
as a challenge and even a threat to their own domestic ideological and political programmes 
and goals”.
46
 Furthermore, Premier Krushchev appeasement towards United States and the 
Western countries was seen as further dividing the rift, though this claim does not assist in 
explaining China‟s engagement with France in 1964, a country with greater ideological 
differences than China and Russia.
47
 China had at the time a large starving population that 
needed to be fed, “at the same time, they wanted to lay the building blocks of a productive, 
modern socialist economy.”
48
 China used its own experience from this time to map out how it 
delivers aid. The different approach as envisioned by Premier Zhou Enlai was to liberate 
these countries from the clutches of capitalism. Although China did not try to influence the 
aid recipients in following its Maoist model of communal production, neither before, during 
nor after the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Exception to the rule was 
during the Great Leap Forward; when General Mao in the mid 1960‟s did interfere in the 
internal conflicts of Africa. This was a time China was returning to Mao‟s wish for 
permanent revolution and the start of the Cultural Revolution. During this time different 
African guerrilla movements recived various types of assistance, according to Brautigam no 
effort was really pushed for the movements to follow the Chinese model, but told them to 
rather view it as a “reference point.”
49
 When it came to foreign aid, Beijing maintained their 
policy of non-interference, only.
50
  
China‟s foreign aid was mostly of an ideological nature, but with more African countries 
gaining their independence there was an ideological pragmatic shift as China‟s aid also 
focused on non-socialist countries.
51
 The Foreign Minister of the People‟s Republic of China, 
Premier Zhou Enlai visited Africa three times. Zhou, a skilled diplomat, helped forge 
peaceful co-existence with The United States and also facilitated Richard Nixon's visits to 
China in 1972.
52
 Zhou initiated the Five Principles of international relations between China, 
Africa and the Arabic countries. It was in 1964 that Premier Zhou laid out the Eight 
Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Cooperation to Other Countries; a set of 
principles that still govern the way in which China still works. Below, these are briefly 
explored: understandings  
1. Equality and mutual benefit 
2. Respect for sovereignty with no conditions attached 
3. Provided through interest-free loans 
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4. Promotes self-reliance, not dependency 
5. Supporting  projects that produce quick results 
6. Uses best-quality equipment of Chinese manufacture 
7. Emphasises technology transfer through technical assistance 
8. Chinese experts will live at the standards of local experts.53  
Initially China assisted with technical assistance and initiated small sized turn-key project in 
agriculture and industry as well as shipments of medical teams.
54
 China‟s first major foreign 
aid project was the funding of the 1970 Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA). Even after its 
completion in 1975, China would return in the 1980‟s and 90‟s; to “repair, rebuild, and 
consolidate many of their earlier infrastructure and production projects”.
55
 By the 1970‟s 
China had distributed more aid to countries in Africa than the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR). USSR was giving aid to twenty countries as compared to China‟s thirty. 
One possible way of measuring their success in „acquiring‟ friends would be Beijing being 
granted their seat at the United Nations. This was achieved with special help from the 
permanent representative of Tanzania. After gaining this seat, China expanded its   
proliferation of aid to thirteen additional African countries.
56
 In the 1970‟s Beijing end goals 
for its aid was, according to Brautigam; mostly strategic diplomacy, assisting in moving 
countries' recognition of Taiwan over to Beijing, as well as counteract Soviet and Western 
influence.
57
 During the mid-1970‟s China limited its aid, finalising their agreed upon 
projects, but evaluating more critically new projects. This was largely due to Vietnam, which 
swallowed almost half of China‟s aid budget, between 1967 and 1976. For Vietnam around 5 
per cent was used for government expenses. Although China did not try to export their 
Maoist model, it did influence the amount of aid it was giving.
58
  
During the years 1972 and 1977 the topic of foreign aid had taken a more central focus, the 
State Council supported five national conferences on foreign aid during this time. The 
financial strain aid had on their economic capacity was being felt and with the end of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1976 and death of General Mao in 1976; China would gradually open 
up and move from a planned economy to the socialist market economy. It was during this 
time that Beijing reformed its foreign aid agenda. In 1963 Premier Zhou Enlai put forth the 
goal of the Four Modernisations which should help China achieve “comprehensive 
modernization”
 59
 in four key sectors: agriculture, industry, national defence, science and 
technology. Zhou revisited these proposals in January 1975 in his last public appearance as 
Premier. The Four Modernisations proposal would be adopted after the death of Mao to get 
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the engine of the economy going. These would also be the pillars upon which Den Xiaoping 
would carefully open China, a stark contrast to the Great Leap forward of Mao.     
2.4 Transformation and Consolidation Stage (1978-1990) 
This stage would set the course for China‟s current aid structure, by the country 
implementing its own experience as recipient of foreign aid from Japan, especially and 
United States and the European countries in general. China was at this stage, in a similar 
position to what some African countries currently find themselves in; having sizable deposits 
of natural resources (copper, coal, gold and oil) and mostly having agrarian economies. Japan 
was the first country to enter the People‟s Republic of China's market. Aligned to the fears of 
other countries around the oil crisis of 1973 including China; Japan was concerned about 
their energy security. In an effort to diversify its oil imports, Japan started importing oil from 
China. Japan had already tried this approach by using its deferred payment yen loans to India 
in 1958. This meant that India could get Japanese mining technology, technical assistance 
and financing through credit. In return, Japan would get two million tons of iron ore annually 
for over ten years.
60
 This method of commodity-backed export credits have, in turn been fine-
tuned by China over several decades.   
A remarkable aspect seen through the Sino-Japanese engagement highlights the pragmatism 
that existed then. China wanted to industrialise and Japan needed energy security - it was a 
tactical “win-win situation that would lay the foundation for the rise of China‟s industrial era. 
In relation to aid, this experience highlights China's current practice of fostering mutually 
beneficial development; where countries at different levels of development, benefit from 
technological, technical assistance and industrial development. This is also seen in the 
Chinese opening up new markets for its own companies, and thus securing its place on the 
modernisation ladder. By 1977 Japan were importing nearly half of its petroleum from China. 
With the mutually beneficial agreement in place, Japan would offer finance, industrial 
technology and materials. China would supply natural resources on a deferred payment 
basis.
61
 One Chinese announcer remarked: “construction of an oilfield will be paid for with 
oil, construction of a coal mine will be paid for with coal and the construction of a factory 
will be paid for with the products of the factory.” Brautigam illustrates this compensatory 
trade model as follows “a Japanese firm exported sewing machines to China and was paid 
with 300,000 pairs of pyjamas”.
62
 Such barter activity assisted companies and countries that 
lacked foreign exchange to still modernise. Japan was acting in self-interest. It made sure that 
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While the above practise is sound and has existed for a while, it has been the crux of 
accusations levelled against China, by its critics; who continue to assume that its motives for 
providing foreign aid to Africa are solely based on resources. A World Bank study claimed 
that “most Chinese government funded projects in Sub-Saharan Africa are ultimately aimed 
at securing a flow of Sub-Saharan Africa‟s natural resources for export to China.”
64
 This does 
not go to say that China is not active in resource-rich areas; it needs resources to sustain its 
economic development. But suggesting that aid projects are tied to resource is according to 
Brautigam untrue.
65
 China provides aid, as earlier outlined to every African country which 
respects its One China policy. According to Brautigam research points to the fact that China 
does not necessarily allocate more aid to countries with natural resources. In countries such 
as Angola, China has for example - through China Eximbank - given sizable competitive 
market based loans to finance infrastructure “with payment guaranteed in oil.”
66
  
It is clear that China's interaction with the continent favours mutual win-win cooperation by 
mixing business and development. China‟s “four principles on Sino-African Economic and 
Technical Co-operation” launched by Premier Zhou Ziyang in 1983 in Tanzania, (China‟s 
and Norway‟s biggest recipient of aid at the time).
67
 These four principles differed slightly 
from the Zhou‟s “Eight Principles” of 1964 which focused more on respect of the sovereignty 
partner countries and ensured that Chinese aid personnel would live according to the recipient 
country's citizens. The “Four Principles” emphasised “mutual benefits, practical results, 
diversity in form, and common development.”
68
 Another distinctive element was in the use of 
the word 'aid', but rather China used cooperation. In African countries this would “take a 
variety of forms…undertaking construction projects, entering into cooperative production, 
and joint ventures.”
69
 These have since been the guiding principles of China‟s aid to Africa.
70
 
The shift came as a response to China‟s own need to focus on its own development, and an 
end to projects such as the Tanzania-Zambia Railway.          
In 1978 at the third session of China‟s eleventh Communist Party Congress, Deng Xiaoping 
and the second generation lead rship of reformers managed to overcome the opposition of the 
Maoists. Together China's economic pragmatism and experimentation remained the guiding 
principles in the years to come; crossing the river by feeling the stones.
71
 This new path 
would yield greater impact to Chinese foreign aid, with the focus remaining mutual benefit 
and economic sustainability through the aid. 
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The 1980‟s would see China initiating the consolidation of their former aid projects, with the 
realisation that, in order to make the project efficient, there was a need to have Chinese 
businesses more directly involved in the projects. This shift came from China's own 
experience with Japan, with natural resources being exchanged for technical expertise and 
industrial products. During the late 1970‟s and 1980‟s China's foreign aid decreased, while 
the earlier development programmes were kept. During this time, there were high-level 
debates on how to structure the aid and whether or not it was feasible to have an aid 
programme. And if such programmes were to be pursued then how these programmes could 
be integrated with the Four Modernisations.
72
 During this stage, China was giving aid to 
seventy-four countries. The majority of these were located in Africa, with more projects on 
the continent than United States.
73
 In the later part of this stage, China would work towards 
enhancing the efficiency and sustainability of its aid projects by beefing up its feasibility 
studies. This was critical to help prevent the failure of projects after they were handed over. 
With economic difficulties being experienced during the 1980‟s, African countries' debt 
levels increased.  
While the Western aid architecure would move towards conditionality, Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAP) and using service delivery thorough NGO‟s, China would take a different 
path. This was mainly reforming past projects, making an effort to rejuvenate projects that 
were barely staying afloat. Politically, these efforts were less visible, and from the tactical 
lens it could at times be more difficult to upgrade and repair than to build anew. The new 
slogan for this path was; “being responsible to the end.”
74
 This new effort to consolidate new 
and old aid projects had implications to China‟s commitment to non-interference of internal 
affairs of recipient country. After a project is finalised, workers were expected to return 
home. Premier Zhao Ziyang solved this dilemma by providing   management assistance to the 
projects, in the hopes that this would be “helping them to build self-reliance”. The time frame 
for the technical and management assistance would depend on the availability of local staff. 
At one project in Tanzania, and even after a decade, assistance was still needed.
75
 To 
counteract such difficulties, China ventured to find solutions to avoid aid projects failing after 
finalisation. It looked at creating linkages between aid and investment. Again, China would 
not follow the Bretton Woods conditionality approaches, which set privatisation of national 
companies as condition for further aid. I am going to cover conditionality in much more 
detail in chapter 4. China would not pose privatisation as a condition; rather privatisation was 
suggested for some of the projects to ensure survival of past projects.
76
 This and other tools 
where during this time being developed in effort to find ways to avoid projects failure. There 
are two distinct developments that had great influence on China‟s aid, were the diplomatic 
wars between Taiwan and China and the decision to join the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT); which later evolved into World Trade Organisation (WTO). When the 
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rest of the world was pulling out of the African continent, China saw Africa as a continent of 
opportunity.  In this next and last part we are going to see how China link aid and investment.  
2.5 Reform and Institutionalisation Stage (1990-Present) 
The reform stage sets the platform for a new phase in which China would put into place the 
development tools needed to benefit from the opportunities that they believed Africa held. 
This was done in order to create a win-win situation by weaving trade into aid. This stage 
would have a marked increase in foreign aid by China, as seen in figure 1.1 below. This was 
a time of major aid reforms through lessons learnt from the 1980‟s. In 1994, three policy 
banks were established; China Export Import Bank, China Agricultural Development Bank 
and China Development Bank. China Export Import Bank would play a very important role 
in China‟s reform of their foreign aid. This latter bank was the centrepiece of one of the key 
reforms in 1995 with the introduction of concessional aid loans. This reform would turn a 
new page in Chinese aid with the focus being on providing medium and long-term low-
interest loans. This period saw a continual focus on South-South cooperation rather than the 
North-South. According to Brautigam this “marked the most dramatic formal change in 
china‟s aid programme since its inception.”
77
 In 1995 China's reforms took steps towards 
market oriented principles and stressed the connection between aid, trade and investment.
78
     
Beijing's leadership understood that this modernisation would put further constraints on the 
country's natural resources. This was exacerbated further by demands from its own 
population to deliver progress. Thus reforms needed to take place. In moving towards reform; 
the Chinese leaders - in an effort to sensitise African leaders of this change in the 
development structure - visited more than twenty four African countries during the period 
1995-1997. African leaders where worried about this shift in policy, especially since some of 
the aid projects, such as the Tan-Zam railway, would need to be run more efficiently. 
According to Premier Zhu Rongji, the railway was overstaffed by about 2,500 workers.  
Chinese Premier Li Peng visited six African countries in 1997. Peng emphasised to the 
African leaders that; “Ch na‟s basic policy of providing aid to Africa has not changed 
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Fig. 2.1 Variation on the scope of China’s Foreign Aid (Unit 100 million RMB) 
 
Source: Li Xiaoyun and Wu Jin, China‟s Foreign Aid: Historical Evolution, Architecture and Challenges (2011)80 
During this stage, China was putting greater emphasis on increasing the capacity in recipient 
countries by, among other things, enlarging the technical training and officials from recipient 
countries were receiving training in China.
81
 China took a different path than the Western aid 
actors in dealing with this issue, where the Western aid architecture where promoting SAP‟s 
and conditionality. China also ventured towards more private involvement with their aid.  
This was a cooperative between Chinese companies and those in the recipient countries. 
China worked towards increasing its 'soft p wer', ensuring that its rise would be a peaceful 
one by building on win-win cooperation.
82
   
At a 2011 IMF panel discussion on the topic of “BRICS‟s: New Growth Drivers for Low-
Income Countries?” the finance minister of Zambia, Dr. Situmbeko Musokotwane, said that 
the emergence of the BRICS has put Africa back on the world map. Changing the picture of 
Africa the continent that is receiving aid and begging, to a continent where profits can be 
made, where investors can invest safely and create business opportunities and jobs. He 
continued to state that before the BRICS came, there was African pessimism. Africa was a 
continent of conflict, not a continent where one can do business and, "the BRICS are 
shattering that myth."  To put the issue of natural resources from African countries into 
perspective, he said that; “if you can make money from natural resources it is good, you can 
use that money to diversify the economy…Today, what is Canada making money from, what 
is Australia making money from, are they not exporting natural resources?...exploiting 
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natural resources more economically, that is a good first step”
83
 This new stage of 
institutionalized development, entered with the initiation of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. This would be a platform for an interchange of ideas between 
China and African countries. This stage also saw new reforms of the Chinese aid structure. 
From the years 2004 to 2009 Chinese aid increased according to the State Council 
Information Office by an average of 29.4 per cent as illustrated in table 2.1.
84
  
2.6 Structure and actors of Chinese Aid 
According to Figure 2.2, which shows global financial flow, only a small portion of general 
development finance actually constitutes ODA. Many of these financial flows into 
developing countries are assisting in development, alleviation of poverty and increasing 
general human and societal wellbeing. Lama Hammad and Bill Morton estimate that there 
exist more than 1000 financing mechanisms.
85
 Foreign aid is not easily defined. The global 
aid architecture has grown exceedingly complex with increasing financing mechanisms and 
players. Statistics found on this is somewhat murky, but it is estimated that the aid 
architecture consist of about 18,000 international NGO‟s, between 6,000 and 30,000 national 
NGO‟s in developing countries and around 230 multilateral agencies.
86
 The shape and 
magnitude of this foreign aid has increased dramatically the last half of the century. China‟s 
aid still keeps its aid structure along bilateral lines. The crux of its foreign aid is more close to 
business structure than traditional aid. China‟s slight move towards multilateralism in its aid 
structure changed with the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. China first acted unilaterally as it 
has done in the past, feeling it can deliver more efficiently working along bilateral basis. 
China‟s aid shipment was the first to land in Sri Lanka after the Tsunami. Shortly after that, 
China would channel USD 19.5 million of its USD 160 million in recovery effort through the 
United Nations.
87
 This was a first of its kind.  This shows how China wants to be seen “as a 
responsible major power.” Brautigam writes that according some; the Chinese response was 
driven by China‟s diplomatic „war‟ with Taiwan which had pledged USD 50 million in 
recovery funds.
88
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Fig. 2.2: Global Development Finance    
Source: Book, Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities (2011)89 
The financial resources provided by China for foreign aid mainly fall into three types of aid: 
Grants (aid gratis), interest-free loans and concessional loans.
90
 Grants and interest-free loans 
fall under China‟s state finances and concessional loans are provided by the Export-Import 
Bank of China. At the centre of Chinese aid, we have The Ministry of Commerce. In figure 
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Fig. 2.3: Chinese Foreign Aid Structure    
 
Source: Made by the author for the paper.  
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Grants are used primarily to assist recipient countries in construction of hospitals, schools, 
low-cost houses, water supply and other small to medium projects to advance social welfare 
and assist with emergency humanitarian aid. Moreover, grants are also used for technical and 
human resources development. Compared to some World Bank infrastructure projects, 
Chinese employs a stricter financial control with direct cash transfer to project. The recipient 
country or agency never sees the funds. Brautigam argues that this may decrease ownership 




This type of aid is primarily used to assist recipient countries to construct public facilities and 
initiate projects to advance the livelihood of the recipient's population. The  tenure of the 
loans is usually 20 years; with a five years of use, five years of grace and then a ten year 
repayment period.  These kinds of loans are primarily offered to developing countries with 
sound economic conditions. Countries with less sound economic conditions are capable of 




Concessional loans are primarily used to assist countries to advance productive projects 
which generate both economic and social benefits. Large and medium-sized infrastructure 
projects, completion of plants, mechanical and electrical products; technical services and 
other materials. Interest rates of the concessional loans are between 2 and 3 per cent, with a 
repayment time of 15 to 20 years and five to seven years of grace. 61 per cent of the 
concessional loans have been used to assist developing countries in transportation, 
communication and electricity infrastructure. Only around 9 per cent went to the 
development of energy and resources (oil and minerals). 
The above instruments are a closer reflection of the ODA of the DAC members; while the 
bulk of China's foreign aid is not. The concessional loans given by China Eximbank are only 
a small part of their portfolio. Rather, the other official flows (OOF) such as of funds for 
donor country businesses to subsidise or guarantee the companies private investment, export 
credits stand for the lion‟s share of Chinese foreign aid tool base. 
Tied and Untied Aid 
It is quite obvious that untying aid can make the aid architecture more efficient. Aid tying 
implies that aid must be spent on imported products from the donor country companies. One 
example to illustrate this point is the United States emergency food aid; where there can be 
big delays in food aid shipment because the products need to be shipped from American 
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Midwest. According to a report by Bloomberg news agency, in December 2008, it took a bag 
of dried peas six months to reach Ethiopia from United States.
93
 
Although China does claim not to have conditions attached to their foreign aid, loans for 
infrastructure are many times tied to contracts for Chinese companies. A bidding which 
cannot really be defined as transparent and while Chinese aid and export credit in most cases 
seem to be tied, this type of arrangement is widespread in the entire aid architecture. There 
are efforts by OECD-DAC to untie aid by strengthening aid delivery mechanisms; According 
to DAC 86 per cent of aid was untied in 2009. According to recent research on tied aid, the 
condition that part of the aid be used to “procure goods or services from a specific country or 
region – can increase the costs of development project by as much as 15-30%”.
94
 According 
to a report by OECD, there is still a gap between theory and practise of aid actually being 
untied.
95
 An independent study funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 
concluded in similar vein, that contracts still go to the donor country companies.    
China is primarily providing African governments with commercial-rate export credits, and 
so far, there is not many DAC member providing such credits untied. Further complicating 
the tied aid discussion where China is concerned is what makes tied aid in most cases an 
expensive exercise; as most donor countries are relatively high-cost countries. Thus goods 
and services will be more costly than if they were obtained and delivered in recipient country. 
China, still delivers goods and services at rates below traditional donor countries.
96
 Even 
though China uses its own managers and technical staff for projects, they live according to 
local conditions and are paid below their Western colleagues. China Eximbank‟s 
concessional aid guidelines state that the “exporter or contractor should be a Chinese 
company, and that inputs Eximbank-financed concessional aid projects should be procured 
from China, however, aid through Eximanbank is only tied at a level of 50 %.”
97
 In many 
instances the recipient country will negotiate terms and conditions on the percentage of 
workforce that should be sourced within, which can sometimes make a project more 
expensive. This is further made worse by the level of corruption which are increasing and the 
lack of qualified personnel to take on larger infrastructure projects.    
There is very little chance that China will follow DAC norms and standards any time soon. 
even though DAC is working to reduce what they call the challenge of the “growing role of 
non-DAC donors that provide largely tied development funding”.
98
 We are likely to see an 
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increase in efforts by DAC members to influence non-DAC members to move towards their 
aid procedures and standards. Considering the increased role of the emerging non-DAC 
members in the aid architecture, especially Brazil, India and China; these countries have extra 
leverage as they are developing countries which put them at an advantage. Brazil and China 
are success stories. These are stories that other developing countries can easily emulate. 
Further increasing the possible tension between emerging non-DAC countries and DAC 
members is the wide array of economic opportunities that are in place in Africa; where the 
return on foreign investment is, according to a McKinsey & Company economic study; 
higher than any other developing region - this goes beyond mere natural resources. Industries 
such as telecommunications, retailing and banking are according to the report, flourishing.
99
 
Norway would start slowly giving aid and then went on to become a champion of aid in the 
Western aid architecture. China on the other hand, is currently challenging this architecture 
with its weaving trade and aid; while focusing on key areas of infrastructure and trade. China 
is, as not as we are led to believe, a large foreign aid provider, it is closer in size to the 
medium seized aid providers such as Belgium and Canada.
100
 Further challenging this 
system; is the issue of conditionality which we will cover in chapter 4. As will be explored, 
this is where China‟s unconditional aid and non-interference policy is seen as a welcome 
change by the African governments. The next chapter is going to take a historical and 
structural view of Norwegian foreign aid, looking at how it has developed to become what it 
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Norwegian Aid into Sub-Saharan Africa 
3.1 Introduction  
For many countries foreign aid is an important part of their foreign policy. Norwegian policy 
towards the developing world is to a large extent linked with its foreign aid. This is 
epitomised by aid for development being viewed as a foreign policy objective on its own or 
as an apparatus to realize other objectives. In the case of Norway, foreign aid policy is a very 
important part of their foreign policy.
101
 This Chapter will look at how the historical aspects 
of how Norwegian aid and its structure have laid the foundation for the modern day aid 
architecture. During the colonial period and the 'Scramble for Africa' missionary outposts 
springing up; missionary workers built and ran Orphanages, hospitals, clinics and schools 
mainly.
102
 Norway has always kept a tight bond between the state, the voluntary 
organisations and the research community - what Alse Toje has characterised as the “iron-
triangle”.
103
 From a developmental stance, this assists in explaining the evolution of the 
Norwegian aid system in the last few decades; where some of these voluntary organisations 
have grown big and increased their influential grip on aid strategies and thus foreign policy. 
The Norwegian think-tank, the Institute for the Study of Civil Society (Civita) sees this 
monopolisation or oligopolies as a possible danger for the debate around Norwegian aid. 
They hold that this should rather be driven by actors who know the field well, without close 
ties to those who share the funds. These close ties makes the evaluation of the effectiveness 
of aid problematic since some of these players who work with aid and development are 
juggling between being a donor, recipient and inspectors of the aid.
104
  
According to Helmut Furer, former director of the Development Co-operation Directorate, 
the Marshall Plan was successful because it “created considerable and perhaps excessive 
optimism about the prospects for helping poorer countries in quite different circumstances 
through external assistance.”
105
 Since the 1950‟s the Norwegian development assistance 
policy has gone through different stages, with successive governments and Parliament setting 
the policies, objectives and guidelines for aid implementation.
106
 The Soria Moria 
Declaration,
107
 states that at the value base of Norway, its self-identity is advocating for 
global poverty reduction and international environment activities, and to be a peace nation. 
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Interestingly, this does not define what kind of political path Norway should be following, 
but rather the kind of identity and self-image that is the base of Norwegian aid policies. 
Further, we are introducing a self-proclaimed humanitarian superpower.
108
 A state that has 
worked to attain a self-image abroad and at home, of being a unique and morally high worthy 
nation; incorporated in principles of self-responsibility - an altruistic messenger of a righteous 




3.2 Establishment phase 1860-1960  
The early period consisted of limited funding coming from public or the state. Norway got a 
sizable part of its aid influence from the experience the missionaries had gained in their 
development work, as well as ideals and norms - especially connected to the state's welfare 
and as we will see; the international conditions which would shape Norway. The missionaries 
established schools and health centres, work that would resemble some of the development 
aid projects that would be initiated by the Norwegian state. According to Jarle Simensen, the 
work of the missionaries can be demarcated in the contemporary development terminology; 
where the educating mission of the missionaries could be viewed as part of a Western 
expansion.
110
 Terje Tvedt has argued that the post decolonisation development aid politics 
embodied a prolongation of this civilizing mission.
111
  
The missionary society (Det Norske Misjonsselskap) in Norway was established in 1842 and 
would start its work in Africa some years after its founding.
112
 In this early phase Norwegian 
missionaries settled in India, South Africa and Madagascar. By the early 1960‟s Norway had 
1,200 missionaries working abroad.
113
 Other Norwegian missionaries which would lay the 
foundation for the Norwegian aid architecture focused on women. Some of these missionaries 
would give women new roles, as both the receivers and givers. Swedish missionaries hoped 
that “raising African girls to „proper womanhood‟ would…force indolent male Africans to 
work”.
114
 This was an approach which has also been recognized in Norwegian missionary 
activities.
115
 Sunniva Engh holds that this should not be seen as an effort to empower women 
in the sense that we know the term today.
116
 Missionary schools where “deeply gendered 
institution[s] reproducing the patriarchal views both of missionaries and of African 
society”.
117
 According to Helen Sweet they were training the girls for “a life of servitude and 
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 What would distinguish missionary work from later development aid 
work was the underpinning of religion. One of the missionaries main goals was religious 
transformation rather than social and economic development. Engh holds that they did not 
“aim to alter contemporary international power structures or encourage self-sufficiency from 




The Norwegian government wanted to separate its aid delivery from religious connotations, 
so though its aid would later resemble the work done by the missionaries; the state-run aid 
avoided the main activities undertaken by the missionaries activities; the influence from the 
experiences and projects run by the missionaries cannot be understated.
120
 Compared to 
Norway and Sweden, German and British aid influences could be construed along the same 
lines as their colonial ties or contemporary international political developments than 
missionary influences, which the two countries had traditions of.
121
 Countries without strong 
colonial heritages would rely more on the foundations laid by the missionaries; which heavily 
influenced the development of their aid architecture.  
A move that gravitated development work towards the state could be seen when Britain 
initiated the Colonial Development Act of 1929.  This was moving away from the tradition of 
creating self-sufficiency in the colonies. Britain then set up a fund to finance development 
work, which would include railways, agriculture, roads, electricity, mineral resources and 
financing of the importation of equipment.
122
 This was the first stint of tied aid. However, aid 
to developing countries did not really occur after the Marshall plan and Truman‟s Point Four 
program which was developed from 1949-1950. In this case, aid to Africa was linked to the 
decolonisation process, mostly from the former colonial powers. It is important to note that 
the colonial powers had no real ambition to finance state welfare programmes for Africans.
123
 
The essence of Truman‟s Point Four program was to “embark on a bold new program for 
making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”
124
 Norway, which took pride in being a 
non-colonial state, saw itself more suitable then the former colonial powers to provide aid. 
During the 1950's and 60's, Norway was amongst the least lavish of the Western donors.
125
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Against the backdrop of the contemporary political landscape of the time, Norway‟s early 
state-led foreign aid policies started emerging. After World War II the United Nations (UN) 
and the Bretton Woods institutions would influence Norway‟s aid architecture significantly. 
Norway was part of the founding members of the UN and Norway‟s foreign minister Trygve 
Lie (who was in exile during the war), was elected to be the first Secretary General of the 
UN. He would be the protagonist who firmly set Norway's affinity to the organisation. The 
UN assisted in facilitating an arena upon which smaller nations such as Norway could co-
operate with other countries of similar background, increasing their strength and influence in 
changing the power structures that were taking place. This assisted in solidifying their status 
abroad and at home. 
126
 
The United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions emphasised the goals of social and 
economic development; with the main priority being international security; it was United 
States that ushered the development doctrines that would shape international politics.
127
 
During the period 1948 to 1952 Norway received close to USD 450 million through the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).
128
 It was inferred that countries 
who received this aid had a moral obligation to assist other countries in a similar vein. Also, 
the Marshall Plan had substantial influence on the future of aid delivery with the belief that 
through aid; countries could achieve political stability and economic growth. Further the 
Marshall Plan required that recipients of  aid had to become part of OEEC which later in 
1961, would be superseded by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD); an organisation which would set the stage for the development of the Western aid 
architecture. According to Olav Stokke, even though the Cold War influenced the Norwegian 
foreign aid during this time; the connection between the welfare state ideals and the aid 
policies are connected.
 129
  Stokke sees that development aid is an extension of the domestic 
policies, where Norway as the donor wishes to create a model which could be followed by 
recipient countries.
130
 This is especially true when one looks at programmatic interventions 
around population control and family planning.
131
     
Norway‟s first (bilateral) aid project was in to India, in 1952. It was facilitated by Trygve Lie 
which helped to secure the approval of the Prime minister of India, Jawaharial Nehru. This 
bilateral aid project was funded under the 'India fund' - a fund for assistance to less-developed 
countries.  This agreement was a joint project between Norway, UN and India to provide 
support for the health and fisheries sector in Travancore-Cochin (later renamed Kerala). A 
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co-funded project, Norway donated USD 15.5 and India supplied USD 16.2 million and took 
over the operations in 1972. Part of the reason why India was chosen instead of other 
countries was due to the Cold War anxieties. India was seen as an ideal partner to initiate an 
aid programme; since India was independence already in 1947, the aid programme with India 
would not collide with other Colonial powers and NATO allies. This all happened during the 
time when African countries where still colonised, making an aid projects on the African 
continent problematic due to conflicts of interest. The India-UN-Norway project was a classic 
example of Cold War aid; where economic development was not the only target, but also 
assisting in averting communist sympathies.
132
 India was viewed as a key country to partner 
with at that time, especially during this on-going battle of the East and the West in Asia.
133
  
According to Helge Pharo, another critical aspect of Norway‟s first aid project to India was 
an effort by the Norwegian Labour Party to take domestic and liberal inter-party
134
 attention 
away from Norwegian NATO membership and military spending. A letter from Labour Party 
Secretary Haakon Lie to journalist, Anders Buraas at the Labour party; details some of the 
Labour Party's motives from the aid effort at the time:
 135
 
1) ...cover a need felt by people...who politically and psychologically are not 
keeping up with Norway‟s foreign policy orientation, and who for a part lack an 
outlet for their idealistic drive... 
2) Occupy in idealistic work, the many Norwegian “intellectuals” who find that 




The UN was seen as an agency to ensure peace and stability in the world during the Cold 
War, which took place as a result of WWII. As a result of the goal to strengthen the UN, 
Norway set a tradition to which it still works under – this is of channelling part of its aid 
through the UN system.
137
 It was believed that for countries like Sweden and Norway giving 
aid was a profitable endeavour and in the self-interest of the donor countries in ensuring a 
peaceful future in which, in the long run; economic and social development, and growth 
would assist in the creation of democracies and peace.  
                                                          
132
 Helge Pharo, ‘Norge Og Den Tredje Verden’, in Vekst Og Velstand: Norsk Politisk Historie 1945-1965 : 
Regjering Og Opposisjon Under Arbeiderpartistyre, ed. by Trond Bergh and Helge Pharo (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1989), p. 294. 
133
 The battle referred to hear is the ideology battle between communism (China/USSR) and democracy (the 
West).  
134
 There were several elements inside the Norwegian Labour party that was against Norway being part of 
NATO and the increased military spending this meant. In part to subdue this conflict, the Labour party under 
Prime Minister Gerhardsen appointed a committee consisting of some of the Labour members critical of NATO 
and Norway’s closer connection with the US to set up Norway’s foreign aid policy. Since giving foreign aid was 
seen as very socialistic, it was hoped this would subdue this group inside the Labour Party. For more 
information see: Engh, 65–82; Knut Nustad, Gavens Makt: Norsk Utviklingshjelp Som Formynderskap (Oslo: 
Pax, 2003), 154. 
135
 This is Sunniva Engh translation from Helge Pharo, Hjelp til Selvhjelp vol. 1, 35. 
136
 Engh, p. 70. 
137















The decolonisation period was an important period for the development of Norwegian aid. 
Norwegian politicians understood that small nations had an important role to play; “to spread 
the message of international solidarity with the liberation struggles of the third world”.
138
 
During this period, Norway avoided confrontation with the colonial powers; it was more 
inclined to find compromises. According to Helge Pharo, Norway publicly endorsed 
decolonisation while at the same time actually supporting the colonial powers. This was to 
change in the 1960‟s.
139
     
3.3 Establishment phase 1960-1974 
This was a period with big shifts in the development discourse; with a focus towards human 
capital and education. Heinz Arndt sees this as a “shift in [the] whole thinking about the 
problem of growth and development – from physical to human capital. The fundamental 
problem is no longer considered to be the creation of wealth, but rather the capacity to create 
wealth and the capacity resides in the people of a country”.
140
 Further this was the period 
when Norway would enter Africa; a region which was until then avoided due to, among other 
things, the interests of the colonial powers. According to Engh, the Norwegian government 
tried to avoid areas which had a heavy colonial presence and the main areas both in 
geographic location and scope of work of Norwegian missionaries. Engh‟s research shows 
that the “most ardent support for a generous Norwegian development aid budget has been 
found in the political parties and regions that traditionally were closely tied to the missions, 
while religious organisations received much state support for their development work”.
141
 
With decolonisation underway, the focus on assisting newly independent states gained greater 
importance. Pharo describes how the change in the power balance in the UN further assisted 
in this shift towards the African region; and how the change in United States' stance on 
decolonisation, opened up the possibili y for Norway to assert its position for supporting the 
newly independent African countries and the countries still working towards their 
independence.
142
 To put the Norwegian aid in perspective during this time, it is worth noting 
that up to 1974, the amount “earmarked for development aid was even specified on each 
individual tax bill, an indication of the novelty of the whole idea of using Norwegian 
taxpayers‟ money outside the country.”
143
 
This period also saw an expansion of Norway‟s involvement in the developing countries, 
especially in Asia and Africa. In January 1963 the representatives from the four Nordic 
countries signed the agreement for a common Nordic aid to Tanzania.
144
 In 1968, the 
                                                          
138
 A.W Johansson and T Norman, ‘Sweden’s Security and World Peace’, in Creating Social Democracy: A 
Century of the Social Democratic Labor Party in Sweden, ed. by Karl Molin, Klas Amark and Klaus Misgeld 
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), p. 366. 
139
 Pharo, pp. 289–334. 
140
 Heinz Wolfgang Arndt, Economic Development: The History of an Idea (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1989), p. 60. 
141
 Engh, p. 67. 
142
 Pharo, p. 328. 
143
 Simensen, p. 170. 
144
















Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) was established as an 
independent directorate under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Norad‟s task was to 
“draw up plans for the use of Norway‟s total public assistance to developing countries and for 
the coordination of this assistance.”
145
 The increase in Norwegian assistance since 1960, 
when Norway gave USD 15.8 million in total assistance (USD 1.16 million in 1960) 
increased annually, to USD 4.7 billion by 2011.
146
   
Since 1960, Norway has contributed a total of USD 63.5 billion in aid to developing 
countries and of this, USD 17.3 billion went to the African continent. Norwegian foreign aid 
has been distributed throughout 158 countries and to all continents. The region that has 
received the largest amount of aid has been East Africa; West Africa would follow as a 
priority focus region in the later years. Of all the countries receiving Norwegian assistance, 
Tanzania has received the largest assistance overall; receiving roughly USD 2.57 billion from 
1960-2011.
 147
 According to Hilde Selbervik, Tanzania “has been one of the most important 
recipients of Norwegian aid – if not the most important one”.
148
 Putting Norway's assistance 
to India and Tanzania into perspective; Tiril Skarstein calculates the assistance according to 
the income per capita. If you divide this amount between the number of Tanzanians and 
Indians today; the difference is striking. The amounts represent USD 100 for every Tanzanian 
and not more than USD 1.3 per every Indian.
 149 
According to Jarle Simonsen East Africa was 
seen as a region where Norway and other Nordic countries had many vested interests. In 
addition, there was an advantage that these countries where English speaking and the climate 
was an attractive component.
150
  
Another aspect that made Southern Africa a target of aid was the Norwegian anti-apartheid 
movement, which emerged during this period. This would be pushed so that Southern Africa 
would remain on Norway's political agenda. After this, Africa's liberation movements made 
links with Norwegian solidarity organisations and eventually also to the official authorities in 
Norway.
151
 Norway and the other Nordic countries would provide humanitarian assistance 
and diplomatic support to th  liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia, Angola, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Tore Linne Eriksen sees the 15 year period of 1960-1975 as a 
time which marked a change in Norway's political attitude, where even though majority of 
the financial support to the struggle happened after 1975; “there is no other Western country 
[Norway] apart from Sweden-which had such close relations to the struggle for liberation in 
Southern Africa.”
152
 Eriksen highlights that although Norway and the liberation movements 
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had close relations, it was not until 1987 that sanctions would be applied to the apartheid 
regimes, and even then, the laws applying such sanctions had several loopholes.
153
 
Looking at where the Norwegian aid has been channelled; it can be seen how Norway‟s 
foreign and security policy commitment has influenced its foreign aid policy and budget. In 
recent years Afghanistan has become a major beneficiary of Norwegian aid as a result of 
Norway's military involvement. Aid funds have also followed in the footsteps of the 
Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, South Sudan and the Palestinian territories. In the first 
Norwegian study on Norway‟s aid, it was assumed that about 90 per cent of assistance 
covered multilateral interventions; while 10 per cent was given bilaterally. But the aid was 
nationalised quite quickly. Norway realised, according to Simonsen; how aid could be used to 
promote its interests and ideals. In the 1970‟s roughly 60 per cent of the aid was given 




3.4 Turning Point, the Realism phase 1974-1990 
This period saw great changes in the Western aid architecture. It was a period of economic 
recession, oil crisis and ideological change. This influenced the political philosophies and 
values that would have an impact on the foreign aid policies of Norway and other Western 
countries. In the 1980‟s the romanticised era of aid was replaced by realism and even 
cynicism. This period was also marked with a move away from multilateral assistance to the 
UN and the development banks and a return to bilateralism. 
With the rapid increase in the aid budget, Norway began to eye the importance to earmark 
projects through their bilateral and multi-bilateral assistance. Further pushing this trend of 
bilateral assistance forward was the nationalisation of the development assistance, where the 
Norwegian government saw the multiple benefits development assistance had as a tool to 
increase Norwegian interests and ideals.
155
 Up until the mid-1970s, the self-interest of the 
Norwegian foreign aid was very much present. This happened, according to Simensen:  
To the extent that one believed in it [no self-interest], this was a delusion. Self-interest 
was heavy also in Norwegian development aid. The direct delivery of goods, with 
stockfish and fertilizers as major records indicate, was…about 30 per cent [of aid budget] 
in 1970. All in all more than half of the aid in [period 1952-1975] went for payment of 
Norwegian deliveries and wages for Norwegian professionals.
156
 
With a less optimistic world post-1960 and the increase of the rich and poor divide, the future 
was looking less bright. The developing nations came up with the New International 
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Economic Order (NIEO). Interestingly, the only success NIEO managed to attain was in oil 
producing countries. The other newly independent countries' reliance on other natural 
resources for their export; prices fell; with it, the hopes of gaining a levelled playing field 
versus the rich world. According to Stokke, by the 1980‟s, “the industrial world, including to 
a large extent even the five countries included in this study [Canada, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden] were insisting that the poor countries should adapt their 
policies to the needs of the rich world.”
 157
 Also part in the failure of NIEO to a measurable 
degree was the economic slump of the industrialised countries during this period and the 
increasing interest of the larger industrialised countries in the third world. Later in 1985, 
Scandinavian countries would sign an agreement (Nordic-SADCC Initiative) in the aftermath 
of a failed NIEO. The MOU refers to extended cooperation between the Nordic countries and 
of the nine countries in the SADCC region. This Nordic/SADCC initiative became a mini-
NIEO because it sought to realize some of the intentions behind NIEO negotiations by 




Until the 1990‟s and before peace-activism became a central part of the Norwegian foreign 
politics, traditional foreign aid remained at the core. The peace activism and the aid part of 
Norway‟s foreign policy have through the decades become more interwoven in the perception 
of Norway's self-image and in practise. Leira et al claim that the core of Norwegian foreign 
aid lays an altruistic notion of a “rich nation that share its resources with others through 
humanitarian activities and peace work…where people who got more should share with those 
who got less”.
 159
 This purity school of thought and altruism was prevalent at the early stage 
of Norwegian development assistance; in 1976 Norway joined Sweden and the Netherland to 
attain the 0.7 per cent ODA/GNP target, Denmark followed in 1978.
160
 This would set the 
buildings blocks for Norway as the humanitarian superpower. The country would give of its 
surplus but demand nothing in return for its assistance. There was a broad political agreement 
that Norway should achieve 1 per cent of its GNP in ODA, even the polls revealed wide 
public support of that aim.
161
  
As we enter the 1980‟s there is a shift away from the earlier commitments made by leading 
Norwegian bureaucrats and politicians to avoid pushing their ideals and governance 
principles on developing countries, something that differentiated the country  from the other 
Western donor countries at the time. But as we will see during the 1980‟s Norway shifted to 
the tune of the rest of the Western donors' foreign aid policies.
162
 This is an important shift in 
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Norwegian foreign aid, as of 1980‟s Norway is telling the developing countries that Norway 
inhibit the knowledge of what will be needed for progress and that Norway will only give 
assistance to countries who follow the model that Norway prescribes. Until this point, 
Norwegian and Chinese development assistance shared comparable similarities of non-
intervention and limited use of conditionality. This fascinating topic will be covered in 
chapter 4, when covering conditionality.   
Another development in the 1980‟s which would challenge the altruistic aid model was the 
organisational restructuring of the Norwegian aid structure through the strengthening of 
Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Stokke notes that the MFA role in the 
multilateral aid created an opening for Norwegian aid policy to be influenced greatly by the 
international environment; where “the setting also facilitates the use of ODA as a foreign 
policy instrument in the pursuit of non-developmental objectives.”
163
 The great leap in GNP 
per capita during this period increased drastically from USD 2,860 in 1970 to USD 6,540 in 
1975 and to 13,940 in 1984.
164
 This was also a period with low levels of unemployment, and 
a positive outlook to the future due in large, to revenue coming from the oil in the North Sea. 
The start of the financial crisis during the second part of the 1980‟s, accompanied by high 
inflation rates and rising costs. This affected mainland businesses especially the important 
shipping industry, which struggled during the crisis. Instead of foreign aid decreasing, this 
period saw a continuous increase in development aid. 
The 1980s and 1990s saw the emergence of aid conditionality and in the use of Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) to aid delivery in accordance with the Western aid architecture. 
This was primarily in response to the debt and oil crisis of the period, and Norway was no 
exception in linking aid and macro-economic conditions. Tanzania is historically the single 
recipient that has received more foreign aid from Norway than any other country; 




During this period Norwegian aid also saw increased commercialization of its foreign aid. 
According to Eli Vorkinn, there were three trending periods of commercialization. The first 
trend was seen in 1977 with an extended repetition of special terms to guarantee exports to 
developing countries. This first trend was brought about by the crisis in the Norwegian 
shipyard industry, a very important industry at the time. Foreign aid funds were thus used to 
export ships to developing countries. It was the Ministry of Trade which implemented this, 
while the MFA and Norad lost power. As mentioned earlier in the paper, there was very little 
conflict among the political parties during this period; which assists in explaining the second 
change in 1983 to 1985 where two significant changes occurred. In 1983 aid funds were used 
to cover losses arising from Norwegian ventures in the 1970‟s. In 1985 mixed credits were 
introduced. This commercialization stage was less correlative to economic instability but had 
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to do with the Conservative party in power;
166
 who wanted more commercialisation to ensure 
more security during economic turbulent cycles. Due to the shift from a Conservative-only 
government to a coalition led government in 1983; the Conservatives needed to compromise. 
While the Conservatives got to keep the mixed credit, the Christian Democrats got an 
increase in aid volumes and a more focus on world poverty. The third trend occurred in 1992 
with the allocation for mixed credits quadrupled while losses on guarantees from the 1970‟s 
overloaded aid funds, this time through debt relief. This last trend is set against the back drop 
of the economic conditions at the time, with high unemployment rates and demand from 
businesses to enter new markets, especially in Asia.  
3.5 Expansion Phase 1990-Present  
From the late 1980‟s the overall aid volume declined. The 1990‟s saw increased doubts about 
the impact of development assistance. This period signified the end of the Cold War with the 
West and the ceasing of support for despotic regimes, which sparked the emergence of local 
armed conflicts in Africa; set the scene for what would happen in the development aid 
politics. This resulted in increased support for programmes of demobilization and 
reconstruction after war and conflict; including the return of refugees. It was only later on in 
this phase that we would see Norwegian aid officially be realigned with the Soria Moria 
declaration of 2005.
167
 This Declaration stated, among other things, that no conditionality 
should exist in Norwegian aid; it further promoted greater aid transparency. Chapter Four 
covers this issue, and highlights how Norway has not always adhered to this declaration.  
This period also marked an increased polarization of Norwegian aid up until present; with the 
choices of aid recipients. Norway‟s foreign and security policy engagement influenced the 
development budget; especially as Palestine and Afghanistan where new entrants to the 
Norwegian aid portfolio during this period. This period would also see a further shift of 
bilateral aid; in Norway's strength as a peace builder and the emergence of development 
finance following the development rhetoric of increasing ownership.  
According to former Norad Director Per Grimstad,
168
 until the 1990‟s, the Norwegian aid had 
a mentality of superiority - the donor decides where and how to deliver the aid and only after 
do they notify the aid recipients. This was also highlighted in a meeting Grimstad had with a 
finance minister of a country receiving Norwegian aid. He was told that the ministry of 
finance had to change their entire budget as Norway had just appointed a new international 
development minister who had different ideas and goals than his predecessor.
169
 Norwegian 
historian Rolf Tamnes and former Norad director Poul Engberg Pedersen voiced concern 
over the large numbers of countries that received Norwegian assistance in the 1990‟s and 
early 2000; making assessing the impact of aid during this time, difficult. Whereas only a 
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handful of countries received ODA from Norway in the 1960‟s, this number had increased to 
about a 100 by 1993, but then there was a decline to about 35 in 2011.
170
  
After recommendations from the North-South/Development Aid Commission, Norway 
established in 1997 Norfund an investment fund that would be a key part of Norwegian 
development policy. This was a company that would be governed under the MFA. The 
objective of the fund was to alleviate poverty through investment; by using investments in 
and providing loans to profitable and viable companies. Norfund operates in countries which, 
in many instances, would not receive investments and loans due to the bureaucracy and the 
high risks associated with doing business there. In 1999, Norfund had an annual capital 
contribution into Africa of USD 23 million; this would increase to USD 171 million in 
2011.
171
       
There were still strong connections between aid ownership and recipient responsibility in the 
earlier part of the 2000s. After the adoption of the Millennium Declaration at the UN summit 
in 2000, a set of Millennium Development Goals (MDG‟s) where crafted. These linked 
poverty reduction to international aid. Under Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, Norway took 
the responsibility of   achieving the MDG goals number 4 and 5 which include the reduction 
of child mortality and the improvement of maternal health by 2015.
172
 The political and 
security challenges after the September 11 attack would blur the distinction between aid and 
foreign policy. The second significant change during this period was the Paris Declaration of 
2005. The Declaration main goals at improving the qu lity of and impact of aid: 
1. Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty 
reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption. 
2. Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local 
systems. 
3. Harmonisation: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share 
information to avoid duplication.  
4. Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development 
results and results get measured. 
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The same year as the Soria Moria Declaration in 2005, the Norwegian Government launched 
its Oil for Development (OfD) programme. The operational goal of the programme was 
“economically, environmentally and socially responsible management of petroleum resources 
which safeguards the needs of future generations”.
174
 Due to the problematic history and task 
of nations distributing the welfare coming from oil to the rest of the population in developing 
countries, OfD sought to assist in a cross-cutting assistance platform. Norway itself an oil 
producer since the 1980s sees itself after decades of experience having the right qualifications 
to assist developing countries in best managing these resources. This was a similar 
argumentation made for Norway‟s assistance in fish management in India, Tanzania and 
Kenya during the 1950‟s and 1960‟s.
175
 
According to Tvedt, Norway has built its politics as a peace nation on a foundation that its 
foreign policy rests on being without self-interest claims. The Norwegian foreign policy 
environment systematically portrayed themselves as bearers of universal values, culture-
neutral and essentially non-political; at the same time the Norwegian government participated 
in and wished to pass along the Western values in the war in Afghanistan and Libya, defining 
it as a mission without self-interest. This, Tvedt argues, is an effort to make the rest of the 
world more similar to Norway. Tvedt reasons that this system promoted a distinctive 
Norwegian moral thinking, the goodness regime which inhibits critical debate.
176
 Former 
minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre opposes this view, when he claims that:  
“For me as Secretary since 2005 has been focusing on Norwegian interests... In such a 
world, aid and peace policy not only good and kind instruments, grounded in 
international solidarity. There is also global realpolitik, and the approach to foreign 
policy choices must be about what I have called "global realism"… A few years ago 
launched Tvedt term "Goodness regime." It is an elegant formulation that describes a 
way of thinking of the people behind the policy which is almost intoxicated by the 
ambition of wanting good. I've never seen myself in that term to describe the foreign 
policy I have been responsible for. I never fell for that little bit towering tradition of 
Norwegian foreign policy discussion where Norwegian aid and peace policy is seen as an 
expression of a distinctly Norwegian peace ideology. If Norway is referred to as the 
defender of goodness, it must be for what we do, not what we say we are."
177
      
Below are the points covering the issue of conditionality and aid in the Soria Moria 
Declaration on International Policy of 2005. It states as follows: 
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The Government will: 
 work to ensure that the appropriations for the development work meet the target of 1 
per cent of GNP and that the grants are then gradually increased further during the 
period, 
 work to ensure that the multilateral aid is increasingly switched from the World Bank 
to development programmes and emergency aid measures under the auspices of UN 
agencies. Norwegian aid should not go to programmes that contain requirements for 
liberalisation and privatisation, 
 lead the way in the work to ensure the debt cancellation of the poorest countries´ 
outstanding debt in line with the international debt relief initiative. The costs of debt 
cancellation must not result in a reduction of Norwegian aid, cf. the adopted debt 
repayment plan. No requirements must be made for privatisation as a condition for the 
cancellation of debt. The Government will support the work to set up an international 
debt settlement court that will hear matters concerning illegitimate debt.
178
 
Even with this strong commitment to unconditionality, Norway‟s ability to withstand the 
temptation of using foreign aid to ensure human rights and democratic foundations in a 
recipient country has proven difficult. With the shift towards greater bilateralism in the 
Norwegian aid architecture, Norway has according to Simensen used foreign aid to promote 
interest and ideals.
179
 This case will bring us to the next chapter of conditionality, a 
fascinating topic, which will assists in further dissecting and comparing these two actors. 
Norway as we just have covered has committed itself from the early stages of its foreign aid 
to non-interference and to todays of abstaining from using conditionality. This is similar to 
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Comparative Analysis of Conditionality 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore conditionality and non-conditionality in foreign aid, a subject that is 
fraught with controversy over the last decades. Conditionality is still a widely used tool by 
different actors in the Western aid architecture, especially making aid conditional on political 
policies (human rights and democratisations) of recipient countries. The term conditionality 
was according to Selbervik
180
 changed to the more politically correct term “partnership” as 




 Conditionality has been used 
for different purposes by donor countries; economic, ideological, cultural, strategic and 
political. Stokke puts forward that “for the donor governments, development assistance has 
been – and still is – an instrument to pursue foreign policy objectives.”
182
 Conditionality is 
explored in this paper, to compare Norwegian and Chinese conditionality unconditionality.
183
 
Critics maintain that conditionality is faulty by design. Collier is not against conditionality as 
a tool, but is critical of the operationalization of it.
184
 Moyo maintains that on paper 
conditionality makes a lot of sense, but that the 'conditionality' aspect of the aid has been 
ignored by the recipients.
185
 Roger Riddell saw the “the introduction, the extension and the 
widening of conditionality” held some the key features of Western foreign aid during the 
1980‟s and 1990‟s.
186
 Tony Killick has gone so far to claim that conditionality is “an ugly 
recent (1996) addition to the English language with which government officials in indebted 
countries have become all too familiar.”
187
  
In this chapter, I give a brief introduction to the history and development of conditionality. I 
compare Norwegian and Chinese use of conditionality and rhetoric of unconditionality in 
their foreign aid, looking into the use of political and economic conditionality as well as ex 
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ante and ex post conditionality.
188
 Norway‟s rhetoric are far apart, whereas China has so far 
been following its aid guidelines of non-interference, though imposing a consistent set of 
standard conditions to its aid delivery. I will briefly look at the two countries experiences 
using forms of conditionality in terms of the “Washington Consensus”
189
 and the “Beijing 
Consensus.”
190
 I will delve into China‟s unconditionality using Zimbabwe as a short case 
study, where China has drawn criticism for prolonging Mugabe‟s dictatorial rule. I will 
explore the claim that China‟s aid is not „unconditional‟; that China‟s main interest is 
acquiring natural resources for its continued economic growth.
191
 Lastly, Norway's behaviour 
is analysed using the game theory model called “Samaritan‟s dilemma”, which highlights a 
welfare state such as Norway foreign aid behaviour vis-à-vis their recipients and recipient‟s 
negotiation power; where the dominant strategy used by the donor, is to disburse aid.
192
  
Conditionality is a very broad term. In this paper when referring to economic (first 
generation) and political conditionality (second generation) I specifically refer to Kahler‟s 
definition of conditionality as “an exchange of policy changes for external financing.”
193
 
According to Stokke it is “the denial of aid if the set conditions are not met.”
194
 The main 
focus of this paper is second generation conditionality, which according to Stokke has an 
overall aim for policy reform by “involving the system of government, democracy and 
participation, and human rights, in particular civil and political rights.”
195
 Furthermore, 
conditionality is not seen as an “aim in itself but an instrument by which other objectives are 
pursued.”
196
   
4.2 The Evolution of Conditionality 
When discussing current forms of aid conditionality, we are dealing with what Stokke calls 
first and second generation conditionality, which represents a move from economic to 
political conditionality.
197
 First generation conditionality can be traced back to the 1960's and 
                                                          
188
 The distinction between ex ante and ex post conditionality may be unclear when analysing aid 
conditionality of the donor. Ex ante conditionality denotes that the donor will not give aid to a recipient 
country or other entity such as an NGO if assured criterions have not been met in the recipient entity previous 
behaviour (an ex post assessment) and/or unless there are reforms in order to meet such standards or an 
explicit commitment to undertake such reforms. Ex post conditionality suggests an unequivocal understanding 
between the two parties that continued assistance at a future point in time will be based on the recipient 
preceding performance or commitment made in ex ante. 
189
 The term was originally coined in 1990 to refer “to the lowest common denominator of policy advice being 
addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989”. Since then the term 
has evolved to encompass neoliberal policies.  
190
 This term was coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004. It captures China’s rise and how its development 
trajectory is challenging entrenched practises and ideologies. It is according to Cooper Ramo a replacement to 
the “widely-discredited” Washington Consensus.  
191
 Hodzi, Hartwell and Jager, p. 91. 
192
 Selbervik, p. 6. 
193
 Zormelo, p. 7. 
194
 Olav Stokke, Aid and Political Conditionality, ed. by Olav Stokke (London: Frank Cass in association with 
EADI, 1995), p. viii. 
195
 Stokke, p. viii. 
196
 Stokke, p. 2. 
197















early 1970's, with the realisation that accelerated growth had failed in the developing 
countries in South America and Africa due to large discrepancies between promise and 
practise.
198
 Further aggravating the situation was the entrenched structural economic crisis in 
the developing nations at the end of the 1970's, due to, among other things, to declining 
commodity prices, the oil crisis, and poor macroeconomic management. It was only during 
the 1980's, that first generation conditionality was developed and initiated.
199
 For developing 
countries to be able to obtain aid, they had to get their economies in order, reducing the 
government involvement in the economy. The new mantra macroeconomic stability had 
strong liberal market traits; urging recipient governments to accept the terms of the Bretton 
Woods institutions and various bilateral donors by undertaking ambitious privatisation and 
liberalisation programmes. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) became a key tool during 
this time. Proponents of neo-liberal theory envisioned this would enable individual actors in 
the target countries to acquire greater prospects for their own development; thus avoiding 




According to Olav Stokke, the revolutionary events in Eastern and Central Europe prompted 
second generation conditionality where “after the disintegration of the Eastern bloc and its 
core power, major Western powers were searching for a new justification for their 
development assistance.”
201
 The main traits of the second generation conditionality are that of 
political reform, “involving the system of government, democracy and participation, and 
human rights, in particular civil and political rights”.
202
 We can assume that some of the 
motivations from the first generation to the second generation conditionality were an effort to 
move away from the government being the recipient of aid. The result of moving away from 
governments being recipients, led to what Hyden and Mukandala describe as the discovery of 
different groups, such as “women‟s groups, community-based organisations and informal 
sector entrepreneurs; all of whom were being described as the true promoters of 
development”.
203
 Groups which had been ignored in the previous development theories. 
Instead of increased assistance to local NGOs- facilitating a bottom up approach - a majority 
of the donors preferred to use their own national NGOs. This in part, led to an explosion of 
the NGOs both in number and influence. Second generation conditionality continues to be the 
standard in the Western aid architecture.  
Hilde Selbervik argues that “if aid is to be used as a mid-wife for reform, conditionality 
seems needed, but the conditions have to be followed up and worked out in real partnership 
with the recipient…Paradoxically the donors are still practising conditionality, but with no 
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clear conception of how to apply it.”
204
 Norway in the last decade voiced its concern with the 
Bretton Woods conditionality policies; Norway‟s White paper no.13 (2008-2009) states that:  
“Countries should decide themselves which policies and measures they wish to 
implement, but in certain areas it is also legitimate and necessary for donors to 
attach conditions to grants and loans, for example to ensure that these are used as 
agreed. Aid without conditions is aid without policy and without proper control. 
We should rather ask what conditions are legitimate to set in connection with 
debt relief and lending.”
205
 
Norway‟s official bilateral aid policy is that it should be unaffectedly recipient-oriented; 
“predominantly for utilitarian reasons (of effectiveness and sustainability) but also in order 
not to interfere in the policy of recipients.”
206
 Aid policies for most small countries like 
Norway are governed and formed by domestic interests and values in collaboration with the 
recipient governments. The problem Norway and other small countries face, is that they 
operate in a complex environment with other donors, multilateral agencies and foreign and 
national NGOs interests and objectives. Stokke proposes that Norwegian aid be seen within 
the paradigm of 'humane internationalism' rather than the realist paradigm of the major 
powers. Within this paradigm, the “primary justification has been neither strategic interest 
related to security nor economic gain for Norway; the stated development objectives may, to 
a large extent, be taken at face value as the main justification…Aid has been driven by the 
same forces that promoted and maintained the welfare state at home.”
207
 Norwegian foreign 
aid is affixed by the same political values, such as self-determination, social, economic and 
political human rights and democracy. A problem arises when these values now built in the 
foreign aid conflicts with the recipient-orientation of aid.
208
  
In the 1990s Norway brought the issues of good governance and human rights in the bilateral 
negotiations with Tanzania. This was not a welcomed move by the Tanzanian government, 
seeing this as a breach of non-intervention. Selbervik mentions that, “the Tanzanians seem 
more relaxed about it now, even though it is still a sensitive topic. For the Norwegian side, 
raising these issues sometimes has been somewhat ritualistic, done out of duty to follow the 
instructions and to appease Norwegian domestic public opinion.”
209
 James Adams believes 
implementing sanctions or restrictions gets more difficult the longer or more heavily a donor 
is invested in the recipient country.
210
 In the case of Tanzania, it has been the most important 
bilateral recipient of Norwegian foreign aid to SSA.    
The question that is then posed is whether Norway has any claim or right to expect recipient 
countries citizens and elected officials to conform to the values and democratic traditions of 
the donor country? Is it legitimate for Norway to use its ODA as a condition to promote 
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values such as human rights, democracy and equality? Tove R. Wang, Secretary General at 
Save the Children Norway claims that it is legitimate to work for social change through aid, 
as long as the objectives are based on universal human rights and as long as the work is based 
locally. Wang claim that universal human rights are not a Western concept, children‟s 
universal human rights are not a Norwegian children‟s value that “we” export to “them”.
211
 
On the other hand is China, an emerging superpower in the classical sense. China does not 
operate in the same way as other donors and claiming it has followed a path of non-
interference, establishing win-win solutions, by putting forward efforts to distance its aid 
from the classical donor-recipient model where aid has been conditional or tied to the interest 
of the donor. China claims that its foreign aid is unconditional,
212
 this is not accurate; the one 
very distinct (political) conditionality that any recipient of Chinese aid has to follow is its 
„One China‟ policy. Countries which enjoy diplomatic ties with Taiwan do not receive aid 
until such a time that they abide with the One China policy.
213
 Former Sierra Leone 
government minister Dr. Seray welcomes the Chinese limited conditionality model, where 
“the Chinese will simply build a hospital and then supply a team of doctors to run it. The 
World Bank will say: „you must have so many teachers on your payroll. You must employ 
some expatriate staff. You must cut down on your wages.‟ The Chinese will not do this. They 
will not say; „You must do this, do that, do this!‟”.
214
 China‟s unconditional policy has been 
welcomed with open arms by some African officials, but some also warns that China‟s 
unconditionality is making it a rogue donor, propping dictatorships and hampering the 
progress of good governance in recipient countries.
215
  
4.3 Political Conditionality   
The Nordic countries where among the first to advance second generation conditionality, 
urging recipient countries to respect human rights and promote democratic institutions.
216
 
William Easterly, a stark opponent to current forms of development aid, claims that official 
aid is not reaching the poor, and further, the conditions does not work to alter government 
behaviour.
217
 China with its unconditional foreign aid policy could be seen to be undermining 
Norwegian and other OECD-DAC member‟s work by limiting their credibility. Aid has been 
rarely given without some sort of conditions, this is to be expected, and highlights the 
problem with conditionality being used as a tool to promote good governance, human rights 
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and economic reforms. Sanctions are only applied as the very last resort, as this has multiple 
implications to aid delivery and the bilateral relations. 
What makes this comparison of Norway and China so fascinating is Norway‟s very 
contradictory claims of its efforts in steering away from conditionality in its aid practise. 
Norway‟s effort to maintain that the recipient countries follow the good governance 
principles collides with its commitments to abstain from the use of conditionality from its 
2005 Soria Moria declaration.
218
 Norway seems to be conflicted, unable to steer away from 
political conditionality, especially when the protection of individual civil and political 
liberties is at stake; even though this could have the repercussion of invading on countries' 
sovereignty. In contrast to China, Norway could be seen to be under the impression that for 
development to take place in a recipient country, it needs to take the Western democratic and 
economic system into consideration. Thus to help the recipients, Norway needs to assist them 
in becoming more like the donor.
219
 China does not seem to face this kind of dilemma. 
According to China‟s special envoy to Africa, Liu Guijin, responding to the claim that China 
is a constraint to good governance; he states that “we don‟t attach political conditions. We 
have to realize that political and economic environments are not ideal. But we don‟t have to 
wait for everything to be satisfactory or human rights to be perfect.”
220
 For Norway this is 
quite difficult. From a domestic point of departure it would be difficult for the Norwegian 
government to have the public support while supporting a recipient government that abuses 
human rights. Further complicating Norway‟s leg room for alternative action, as it is part of 
the OECD-DAC, as well as the Bretton Wood institutions. Standing alone or going against 
the mainstream could present all sorts of challenges for a middle power like Norway.
221
 One 
could argue that China also needs to listen to public opinion in relation to its aid programme, 
but compared to Norway its public are less likely going to fight for human rights and 
democratic principles in a recipient country, rather China has faced public critique in times of 
natural disasters, with critics voicing that aid funds going abroad should go to its own people 
in need.
222
      
The explanation for the continuous presence of political and economic conditionality could 
be that there is currently an absence of any alternative economic theory, and the fact that the 
Chinese model is gaining so much attention, is a call from the developing countries for an 
alternative model, that they can relate more to.  
According to Olav Stokke, Norwegian and Chinese aid policy will, “respond to the dominant 
socio-political norms and the overarching interests of the society and respond to the dominant 
values (norms and interests) of the external environment as well. From such a perspective it 
may be assumed that the aid policy, although part of the domestic and foreign policy of the 
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system, will have distinct features of its own, reflecting the predominant values of the 
domestic and international environment of this specific policy area”.
223
 Compared to the Cold 
War era, the intriguing aspect of this comparison is that China does not urge its partners to 
adapt to its own economic model or political system; but to have a mutually respect for non-
interference.   
Chinese foreign aid has fewer contradictions, it follows its insistence on non-interference in 
other countries' internal affairs, but this does not come without issues and dilemmas, such as 
the assumption that China may be sustaining the rule of human rights violators. There have 
been several voices that claim China‟s non-interference is hurting democratic progress and 
human rights.
224
 This is inferred because of its support of governments and dictators with 
poor democratic and human rights records; including Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea and 
Zimbabwe. Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth claimed that “China‟s 
growing foreign aid program creates new options for dictators who were previously 
dependent on those who insisted on human rights progress”.
225
 Roth is calling for the EU to 
stand up to the task for human rights leadership, finding it wrong of China to view human 
rights as an internal affair.
226
  
Brautigam on the other side asks that in order to realistically analyse the impact of China on 
democracy and human rights on Africa; there is a “need to answer two questions. First: what 
would the situation be like without China? Has China‟s entry changed the playing field 
significantly?...Second (and more controversially): have political conditions attached by other 
donors to foreign aid been effective in improving human rights and democracy in Africa?”
227
 
Brautigam admits that China's rise has given rogue states alternative finance options, but that 
Chinese finance is not unique and is not the only source of finance to be accessed by these 
regimes.
228
 Furthermore, it is difficult to demand set of principles from another country; 
when China does not apply these to itself. With China emerging as a superpower, there have 
also been demands that it should step up and take charge as there are responsibilities that 
follow with such a role.
229
 Western aid donors own track record is not flattering, from 
supporting the likes of Paul Biya, the President of Cameroon; a country which has a horrible 
human rights record a d so has Ethiopia a long time recipient of aid.
230
 It is almost 
impossible to validate the notion that Chinese insistence on unconditionality has tempered the 
progress of democratic institutions and ushered the continuation of human rights abuses by 
the recipient's leadership. This does bring us to the question of whether the human rights of a 
population fall under the internal affairs of a country. Wang and Roth rejects the notion that 
universal human rights are a Western concept but universal.
231
 Roth acknowledges that it is 
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foolish to expect China and Russia to lead when another government's “commitment to 
human rights is so cheaply sold for energy contract or investment opportunities.”
232
  
A good case to further illustrate this point is China‟s support of Zimbabwe, which is still 
under the long (oppressive) rule of Robert Mugabe. This case study will endeavour to analyse 
whether China's interventions may have prolonged his rule and suppression of the 
Zimbabwean nation. When United States and the European countries started enforcing 
sanctions against Mugabe‟s government after the 2000 parliamentary elections and 2002 
presidential elections
233
  the aging dictator replied: “We have turned East, where the sun 
rises…and given our backs to the West, where the sun sets.”
234
 According to Brautigam the 
foreign aid support Zimbabwe has received from China is minimal, even less than Chinese 
support to Sudan. To draw a comparison, Brautigam shows that while the Chinese assisted in 
financing the president residence for Sudan‟s president Omar al-Bashir, China only supported 
with roof tiles for Mugabe‟s residence.
235
   
Hodzi, Hartwell and de Jager view Chinese aid as conditional, since according to China‟s 
White Paper on Foreign Aid (2011); China expects returns on their foreign aid investments. 
With China‟s weaving of aid, trade and investment with keeping development projects 
profitable Hodzi et al sees this as a confirmation that China views these projects as a business 
venture and not with the prime goal to assist in the classical sense of foreign aid.
236
 China‟s 
unconditionality they claim does not focus on promoting human rights, good governance and 
institutional reforms.
237
 Furthermore, since China support the Mugabe regime they are in 
effect influencing the political map in Zimbabwe and “cannot truly claim to uphold a policy 
of non-interference.”
238
 When most nations enforced an arm embargo on Zimbabwe after its 
2002 election; China sent arms; this Hodzi et al assert assisted Mugabe staying in power. 
Brautigam on the other hand does not see Chinese military support as having the effect of 
prolonging or worsening the human rights situation. Brautigam argues that since “Mugabe‟s 
thugs did their brutal work with clubs. They did not use fighter jets and RPG‟s.”
239
 To keep 
the military in check, Brautigam claims that Mugabe made sure these military supplies would 
work as a deterrent to opposition forces. It is difficult to predict if there would have been a 
different outcome if Chi a had joined the rest of the Western donors in their sanctions.  
In the case of Zimbabwe, China has changed slightly its approach, where it has stated that it 
will follow regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) on their actions on Zimbabwe.
240
 In 2009 during the 
Cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe, South Africa withheld its aid and demanded Mugabe form a 
national unity government. China followed with Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu 
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Jianchao stating that; “China along with the broader international community expresses its 
concern with the current constant deterioration of the economic and political situation in 
Zimbabwe.”
241
 Not long after this, Zimbabwe formed the national unity government.  
It is problematic to claim that China‟s unconditional approach is assisting rogue regimes 
staying in power. The availability of funds for these regimes is usually obtained through 
various venues. The history of successful sanctions is far between. China argues that political 
and economic reforms should be developed internally not from an external actor.
242
 China‟s 
insistence on following other regional organisations and countries could be a path the 
Western aid donors could look into, as this can assist in establishing credibility and a more 
coherent policy among the OECD members. Instead of providing aid conditional on policy 
reforms, Collier suggests that the world aid architecture should cooperate to establish clear 
governance standards, and only when countries have achieved these standards are they 
eligible for foreign aid.
243
         
4.4 Economic Conditionality 
It is has become very difficult to draw a clear line between economic and political 
conditionality. Complicating this comparison is the fact that Norway abolished economic 
conditionality in 2005
244
 and China has withstood its use. Norway has officially been 
working to phase out economic and political conditionality in its foreign aid policy both 
bilaterally and through the Bretton Wood institutions. We will cover bellow that Norway still 
uses second generation conditionality promoting principles of good governance and human 
rights in its aid delivery; and at times even these demands have been nothing more than 
rituals in bilateral negotiations; as was seen in the case of Tanzania.
245
 
Since 2000, Norway has withheld aid to five countries; Ethiopia, Eritrea, Zanzibar, 




 In 2009 Norway withheld its entire budgetary 
support to the Nicaraguan government due to election irregularities. This came shortly after 
the United States withdrew USD 62 million, followed by the EU and other donor countries 
that were part of the budget support group.
248
 The actions of the donors forced Nicaragua into 
a difficult bargaining situation with the IMF when negotiating loans since the Nicaraguan 
government no longer received budgetary support from Norway and the other donors. The 
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IMF further demanded taxation of donation,
249
 which contributes a sizable part of 
Nicaragua‟s economy. Norway‟s former Minister of International Development Erik Solheim 
stated that the budget set for the Nicaraguan government would be channelled through 
NGO‟s and individual projects.
250
 For the Norwegian government, this goes against the Soria 
Moria declaration and the Paris Declarations principles of letting recipient government have 
greater ownership.
251
 Joseph Stiglitz a known opponent of conditionalities who chaired in a 
report for the UN said the following on the subject conditionality:      
“It is apparent that the conditionalities often imposed by international financial 
institutions in their support of developing countries were counterproductive. The 
demand that countries implement short-run pro-cyclical policies has exacerbated 
downturns, while long-run structural policies exposed countries to greater risk and 
undermined social protection. It is important to design reforms that prevent, or at least 
reduce the likelihood of, such counterproductive policies in the future. Part of the 




Stiglitz puts forth the notion that the IMF has not only failed to assist developing countries, 
but is directly accountable for continued stagnation and poverty. In response to the critique of 
the Norwegian government's conditional approach to Nicaragua, Solheim claims that the 
critique of the election results - which was the reason for cutting the support - was voiced by 
“civil society, the private sector and the church”.
253
 According to a Norwegian news report, 
the civil society was divided on the issue of the elections and the Ortega government in 
general.
254
 Easterly, claims that most countries tend to ignore the conditions while donor 
countries continue to lend, making it difficult to assess the development impact of 
conditionality.
255
 Even a World Bank report from 2001 concluded that “conditionality as an 
instrument to promote reform has been a failure.”
256
  
China on the other hand, has according to Brautigam, never imposed economic 
conditionality.
257
 The murky area in Chinese aid is their development commercial loans and 
projects which carry terms which can be perceived as conditional. These projects may also 
have pre-conditions set by Chinese financiers and investors. The negotiations of the 
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project/loan usually entail lengthy negotiations, ranging from taxation, land rental, residence 
permits and percentage of national workers. The alternative “Beijing Consensus” could be 
seen as the cause of these kinds of negotiations, creating a more susceptible ground for 
corruption and cronyism since there is less transparency and projects being awarded to 
connections close to the government. There have been some instances of this, but according 
to Brautigam not to a greater degree than what is seen with the Western aid architecture.
258
 
Norfund, the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries, operates along similar 
lines as the Chinese commercial development loans and projects. Norad‟s investments are 
different to the Chinese mix of aid and loan; but they create similar win-win situations and 
limit the possible humiliating paternalistic donor attitudes which have sometimes been 
followed by the trends of economic and political conditionality.
259
  
Norway has committed itself to abstain from political and economic conditionality since 
2005, but in the case of Nicaragua Norway followed the rest of the Western donors in pulling 
their aid and de facto assisted IMF in implementing economic conditionalities. Norway‟s role 
as a credible donor is weakened by such actions. Chinese trade and aid approach could be 
seen by the recipient as more equal, where the conditions for the aid project is discussed and 
negotiated and not coerced.      
4.5 Samaritan’s Dilemma  
To illustrate the constraints that Norwegian conditionality negotiations face as compared to 
Chinese conditionality and credibility, we are going to use the game theory “Samaritan‟s 
dilemma”. This theory is a good tool to clarify Norway's altruistically motivated aid policy. A 
complete picture of the dilemmas faced by Norway, China and the recipients is beyond the 
scope of this section; but we will try to adapt the theory to strengthen the study. James M. 
Buchanan introduced the theory and argument in the spring of 1971, first at seminars at 
UCLA, Kentucky, Harvard, West Virginia, and Western Michigan Universities. A final 
version was given at the Conference on Altruism and Economic Theory held at Russell Sage 
Foundation in 1975. The dilemma is in part created by economic and income growth of 
welfare states such as Norway.
260
 In the area of aid Buchanan explains: 
Stated in the most general terms possible, the hypothesis is that modern man has 
become incapable of making the choices that are required to prevent his exploitation 
by predators of his own species, whether the predation be conscious or unconscious. 
The weakness here may be imbedded in man‟s utility functions. The term “dilemma” 
seems appropriate because the problem may not be one that reflects irrational 
behaviour on any of the standard interpretations. Origins of the dilemma are, in part, 
economic, and these are found in the increasing affluence of choice-makers. Analysis 
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here lends substance to the cliché that modern man has “gone” soft. His preferences 
order, allows him to secure options that were previously unavailable.”
261
             
Selbervik in her use of the “Samaritan‟s dilemma”; points out that due to the Norwegian 
altruism in their aid policy, Norway‟s reluctance to impose utility costs in a “short-term 
perspective is likely to prevent the achievement of their real long-term goals”.
262
 Figure 1 
bellow demonstrates the options for both donor (welfare state) and the recipient. In figure 1 
the value indicators are the takes, arranged in ordinal sequence. For the donor (Samaritan), 
option A and B are not ideal since they do not open the option for the Samaritan to provide 
assistance. The recipient on the other hand is reliant on the donor‟s action. Should the donor 
gives aid (II), the recipient will then go with no reform (II). And since the donor has the 
dominant strategy,
263
 its behaviour is predictable to the recipient. According to this game, the 
solution would then be D. The Samaritan optimal choice here is off course C, and the less 
optimal is A, since this would leave the Samaritan redundant.  
                                                  Recipient     
                                                   Reform I    No Reform II 
Donor            Aid Sanctions I     A (2,2)     B (1,1) 
                       Aid II                    C (4,3)     D (3,4)  
Figure 1. A Samaritan‟s Dilemma
264
 
Further complicating this equation has been the individual donor's ability to introduce 
sanctions; while the prevailing strategy of a donor is to disburse aid. This limits the 
bargaining power of the donor, where the recipient government or agency can effortlessly 
predict donor behaviour. This creates further dilemmas for the donor(s) to make credible ex 
ante conditions. Ex post conditionality could have more power, but with vested interest 
already in place. This also weakens the position of the donor vis-à-vis the recipient. 
Increasing the power of the recipient in the development aid landscape vis-à-vis donor 
welfare states is the disbursement imperative.  
Norway as most democracies, puts in place a rigid budgeting system while the different 
departments need to utilise the funds allocated by end of fiscal year. This reinforces the need 
for disbursement at the cost of credible conditionality. The donor credibility to implement 
sanctions is very weak “unless there is demonstrated willingness to carry out such threats”.
265
 
And even when there has been willingness by Norway to impose such sanctions, this has 
been either short lived or circumvented by Bretton Wood institutions.   
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In an effort to circumvent this part of the “Samaritan‟s dilemma”, Norway (Samaritan) has, 
applied cross-conditionality. By using this strategy, Norway creates a buffer and has to then 
“delegate the power of decision in particular choice situations to an agent, one who is 
instructed to act in accordance with the strategic norms that are selected in advance.”
266
 Such 
an agent could be one of the Bretton Wood institutions or a delegation from OECD. This 
latter strategy has at times proved to be slightly difficult to manage when this buffer created, 
is the very same mechanism that goes against the use of penalties after failure of meeting the 
set conditions. When Tanzania failed to meet conditions set by donors and the Bretton Wood 
institutions in the 1990‟s, the World Bank took up the fight for the Tanzanian government 
and convinced the other donor countries to abstain from enforcing sanctions or pulling funds. 
Selbervik suggests that this was due to the fears that if bilateral donors cut or put on hold the 




China on the other hand, has a much better starting negotiation standpoint. China‟s 
unconditional aid policy is understandably preferred by African leaders. This is a point that 
can be taken from former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, where he finds that on 
many occasions; donors form “a common front in an unbalanced power relationship that may 
have dire consequences to the recipient country.”
268
 Norway have been following 
international aid trends since the 1980‟s, since 2005 Norway have been pushing the Western 
aid architecture to lessen the use of conditionality, especially IMF economic conditions. 
Since 2000 Norway has cut bilateral aid to Ethiopia, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Zanzibar and 
Nicaragua after election irregularities and or human rights abuses. Before 2000, Norway had 
never used this kind of conditionality.
 269
 To explain this trend, Leira et al argues that Norway 
sees itself possessing the knowledge of what is needed in the South and that we will offer our 
foreign aid only to those countries that follow the policies we prescribe.
270
 In Knut Nustads
271
 
terminology Norway assume a caretaker role in development cooperation. And this role has 
become much stronger over the years – we are enforcing a guardianship on the recipient.
272
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5.1 Summary of Findings 
The final chapter will summarise the overall research findings. The aim of this research 
project was to empirically unravel Chinese and Norwegian foreign aid; as well as to introduce 
and map out the dilemmas of conditionality, as an approach. Drawing from the empirical 
work, this chapter concludes that though China and Norway are at the two polar positions of 
the aid architecture; their main goals are similar in that both parties wish to alleviate poverty 
in SSA. Norway‟s aid strategy has been evolving in line with the rest of the Western aid 
architecture; while China‟s foreign aid strategy has remained relatively unchanged. 
Literature reveals that at the core, Western foreign aid architecture has changed little since 
the 1950‟s and that new players such as China are challenging the Western aid architecture, 
especially in SAA.
274
 Norwegian foreign aid has changed dramatically since the Marshall 
plan. As we have seen, Norway has gone full circle on the subject of conditionality; from 
being against it - to supporting it - then working towards limiting its use. Both conditionality 
and un-conditionality were explored in this paper. The short case study of Zimbabwe was 
explored and to an extent, used to challenge the validity of claims by opponents that China‟s 
primary goal to offering foreign aid to countries in SAA is mainly for natural resources. 
Chapter 2 introduced the reader to Chinese foreign aid through a short review of the semantic 
dilemmas of the term 'foreign aid'.  China's terminology and dynamics of aid are very 
different from the OECD definitions and use, making it a distinct player. This part also 
delved into a comparison between the Chinese and Norwegian aid delivery mechanisms. 
China‟s OOF in comparison to Norway and other OECD members makes up the bulk of 
China‟s government-provided finance to SSA, especially  when looking at investment and 
funds coming from the two policy banks of China, Eximbank and China Development Bank. 
The reader was then taken through a four stage historical timeline of Chinese foreign aid 
relations with SSA. Since the Asian-African Conference in Bandung Indonesia in 1955, 
China has moved from an ideological donor; to one that is currently challenging the Western 
aid architecture with its alternative approaches to aid. The Second chapter put effort to show 
that China‟s foreign aid was a product of its experience as a recipient of aid; especially the 
Sino-Japanese foreign aid during the 1970‟s. This would prove to be formative, with strong 
characteristics of a classical barter arrangement. The seeds of some of the criticism level 
against China‟s use of natural resources as security for foreign aid loans and commodity-
backed export stems from this practise. China itself, a developing country, needed to find a 
balance between the needs of its own people and its international aspirations. In an effort to 
create sustainable foreign aid, China has been stressing aid as a tool for helping countries and 
projects to be self-reliant, while being a responsible donor. At the same time China wanted to 
be seen as responsible to the end, especially in its mission to maintain certain projects. In 

















order to create self-reliance, accountability and taking its own domestic considerations into 
account; China under Premier Zhou Ziyang and Deng Xiaopeng steered China towards 
creating linkages that would bring aid and trade closer together.   
The establishment of China development Bank in 1994 introduced Chinese concessional aid 
loans; a new focus that would see the addition of medium to long-term low-interest loans to 
their foreign aid tool box. This marked, according to literature, the furthermost formal change 
in its foreign aid programme since it early beginnings.
275
 With China‟s trade and aid closely 
weaved together, China wished to ensure that its rise was a peaceful one, based on win-win 
cooperation, at the same time distancing itself from Western forms of conditionality. A new 
and surprising change in Chinese aid came with its decision to channel USD 19.2 million in 
recovery efforts through the UN for the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. This could be 
construed as part of its diplomatic „struggle‟ with Taiwan or a shifting strategy to take on the 
role as a responsible major power. In covering tied and untied aid, the chapter further looked 
at how, even with China‟s claims of unconditionality to its aid projects, its loans for 
infrastructure seemed to expose Chinese companies to projects which were tied. Most of the 
infrastructural aid projects, which were officially negotiated through Eximanbank, with 
recipient countries, were tied at a 50% fluctuation rate.  
The Third chapter have shown in brief strokes, how the Norwegian foreign aid has evolved 
over time. Compared to China, Norway is following OECD strategies, while at the same time 
cementing its standing in the international arena as  humanitarian super power. From the 
early missionary interventions until today, Norwegian development policy covers every 
aspects of a recipient countries fabric, from micro-financing to the macro levels of tax 
reforms and family planning policy. The Norwegian aid policy has moved like the rest of the 
Western aid architecture, looking first to reform recipient countries towards democratic and 
human rights principles, from which economic prosperity should follow.  
It can be drawn from the study and from the very early start that Norwegian aid has in part, 
been following a realist paradigm. Norway‟s first aid project in India was in part created to 
silence groups within the Norwegian Labour Party that were against Norwegian NATO 
membership and Norway‟s stronger alliance with the United States. Furthermore, India was 
chosen as a focal country because of Cold War ally considerations and the fact that this it was 
no longer a colony – making it a strategic country of interest. This does not mean that 
Norwegian aid is not based on altruistic motives. Proposals put forth by authors such as 
Stokke, of viewing Norwegian aid within the paradigm of „humane internationalism‟ instead 
of the realist realm are valid. In particular this should be viewed as the primary motivation for 
giving foreign aid not being strategic nor economically motivated, but driven by the same 
political values, self-determination, social, economic, democratic and political values which 
are promoted and maintained in Norway.
276
 The 1970‟s marked a nationalisation period of 
Norwegian foreign aid; in that Norway moved its foreign aid towards bilateralism and 
earmarked key projects, where its interests and ideals were promoted to gain more efficient 
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impact. From the 1980‟s the romanticised era of Norwegian foreign aid was slowly replaced 
by realism 
According to Stokke, Norway slowly built itself the reputation of a peace nation, on the basis 
that its foreign aid is without self-interests.
277
 This is in conflict with some of the decisions 
that would follow. For instance, this was seen in its stance on conditionality; its support and 
participation in the War on Terror in Afghanistan and against dictators in Libya and 
Zimbabwe. Norwegian foreign aid is built on its domestic values, but was also influenced the 
environment in which Norway operates within the international arena, together with the 
Western aid architecture and the Bretton Wood institutions. It is viewed that the shift of 
alignment with other Western donors by Norway in the 80's was Norway's way of telling the 
developing countries that it holds the solutions to how the recipients should run their 
country.
278
 Stokke, Tvedt and Nustad have conflicting views on the altruistic nature of 
Norwegian aid. In part this is because Norway finds itself operating in an ever more complex 
environment, not only with other states but with other donors, multilateral agencies and, 
foreign as well as national NGOs interests and objectives. All these forces are pulling 
Norway in different directions, while moulding Norwegian foreign- aid policy, not 
necessarily in the direction that will benefit the recipient country. China, on the other hand 
has relayed heavily on its development doctrine where economic development is seen as a 
tool that will facilitate and lead to general prosperity for the entire population, while pursuing 
profitability through the projects it funds.   
Both China and Norway have officially claimed that they will abstain from using 
conditionality in foreign aid. Both Norway and China have a certain level of conditionality, 
while portrayed differently, in their foreign aid. The issue of contention is when the applied 
ex ante or ex post conditionality infringes on the internal affairs of the recipient country. 
Norway compared to China, has in its foreign aid punished recipients for election 
irregularities and human rights abuses by ending or withholding foreign aid. Due to the 
current structure of the Western aid architecture, it could be claimed that its actions remain as 
a sort of conditionality trap.  The justification may be that this is used in order to ensure the 
right use of foreign aid and for recipient countries to follow human rights and democratic 
principles and reform, and given the limited options donors have, conditionality is one of the 
few tools at their disposal to ensure reforms are followed.  
„Good governance‟ objectives as covered through the Tanziania and Norway case study were 
pursued through bilateral talks. These have been no more than a ritual by both parties.
279
 
History show us that it is only when a recipient country is diverging sharply from good 
governance, that foreign aid is withdrawn by Norway, and then in unison with the rest of the 
Western aid countries. Very few scholars view conditionality as a good tool. Moyo claims 
that on paper conditionality makes a lot of sense, but as I have shown utilising the 
“Samaritan‟s Dilemma”, conditionality is easily ignored by the recipient government when 
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the sole dominant strategy for the donor is to disburse foreign aid.
280
 Norway and the Western 
aid architecture have been trying, for the last few decades, to make sure their aid reaches 
where is most needed, trying to alter government behaviour to ensure this goal. According to 
Easterly, this has failed.
281
  
Looking at the Zimbabwe case study, with which we attempted to uncover the dilemmas of 
un-conditionality, we are faced with the implausible task of measuring the ramifications. This 
short case study reveals a complex environment in which a nation state operates - an 
environment that leaves the recipient countries with multiple sources of revenue, not only 
from foreign aid. China‟s approach of un-conditionality has not necessarily prolonged 
Mugabe‟s time in power.
282
 There is no correlation between China's aid and the rise of 
dictators or oppressive governments. China‟s adherence to regional organisations and 
neighbouring countries on matters which touch upon the internal affairs of a country, 
provides an alternative approach to the Western aid architecture, and could prove to be a 
more suitable option that the current negative connotations associated with Western aid 
currently.            
5.2 Implications of Aid 
Norway‟s general anti-poverty recipe has been to promote good governance, re-forestation, 
health, education, and capacity and gender rights, into the mix to as a solution. The 
importance of each of these ingredients differs according to the agendas of the current 
government and its officials, as well as to national and international organisations. The issue 
arises when the recipient governments are inclined to change their policies according to the 
development policies of the donor country. The implications this has on the recipient country 
is that it can create a short-term outlook, where the recipients national budget is structured 
according to what is seen by the donor side as an important ingredient to anti-poverty recipe.    
According to Øyvind Eggen certain aspects of the current foreign aid is difficult to carry out. 
The biggest change he claims should occur in “the minds of us on the donor side. Today‟s 
assistance is in fact based on a rationality that was developed in the 1990‟s, which made only 
sense then. If we continue this trend, we will only be side-lined.”
283
 Eggen further claims that 
the ambition to reform the recipient countries is not explicitly mentioned in the Norwegian 
foreign aid documents, but the reform linkage is still very much present in current Norwegian 
aid practise.
284
  He opines that the Western hegemony is weakened, and the Western aid 
world should not take for granted that the recipients would necessarily want or need these 
reforms. This time it is no longer only the leaders and elites which are looking elsewhere, 
common people are also looking to China. Eggen puts forth that “also poor people see that 
the poor countries (mostly in Africa) who tried our development strategies in the 1990‟s, 
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went straight down financially, while Asian countries chose very different ways, did well.”
285
 
China's model seems to leverage on the things that matter most to people: employment, 
income, cheap goods, peace and security. Eggen argues that the Norwegian aid industry 
complicates aid solutions to the 'absurd'; where instead of solving specific issues at hand, the 
Norwegian aid officials “see it as both a right and an obligation to use any aid measure to 
take responsibility for nearly all aspects of another country's development, far beyond the 
original problem that should be solved”.
286
  We could venture to claim that there is no longer 
uniqueness in Norwegian aid vis-à-vis its OECD co-members. While they are quite similar, 




The conformity sought by pushing for reforms by recipient countries to the image, values and 
norms of the West may not be the most efficient path to Norwegian foreign aid. Simensen 
voices the dilemma which haunts any foreign aid; making sure that the funds goes to the right 
places. This dilemma is further enlarged by the recipient asking “what is in it for me, my 
familiy, my party, my next election, my district?”
288
 Secretary General of the Norwegian 
Church Aid
289
 Anne-Marie Helland is of the opposite opinion, claiming that the most 
important actors to fight poverty are the recipient countries themselves. The donor countries 
should listen to their partner countries, they know what they want.
290
 
Some school of thoughts actually see the increase in bilateral assistance by Norway as 
actually having increased dependency. One African expert on aid, Suma Kaare,
291
 claims that 
Norwegian aid has created a weak and donor dependent Tanzanian state, where authorities 
does not feel obliged to meet their own obligations; creating the opportunity for the abuse of  
public funds. Aid, she claims, has created a “beggar mentality” in Tanzaina.
292
 This is in 
contrast of earlier notions of Norwegian aid being based on altruistic and disposition ethics. 
There is little doubt that Norwegian aid has done a lot of good, especially in the areas of 
healthcare and schooling; but we cannot overlook the fact that Norwegian aid policy has 
increased its influence or stance on the international stage, and has created alliances. This 
raises the question of whether Norway's aid policy has been of greater benefit to Norway than 
the once it is missioning to assist. In 1996 Joan Nelson claimed that the use of conditionality 
would with time decrease and there would be more options for the developing countries to 
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choose from , this in the form of additional resources, such as private investments.
293
 
Nelson‟s predictions does seem to hold true with the increased level of investment coming 
into Africa, but it failed to predict the increased interest by the BRICS and the use of foreign 
aid as an extension of their foreign policy goals and interests. 
Aid has never been unconditional and probably never will be. There will always be some 
conditionality to ensure the aid given is reaching the designated areas. The contested issue is 
when the conditions set are counterproductive and infringing on the sovereignty of a recipient 
country; which most conditions belonging to second generation are in fact doing. Chinese aid 
and its unconditional foreign aid policy is challenging Western aid paradigm and could pose 
challenges to the democratisation process. China is giving the SSA governments an 
alternative. In a sense, the Western aid architecture is facing what it promoted in first 
generation conditionality; a competitive environment. The Chinese model of „effective 
governance‟ and possibly endorsement of „bad governance‟ could turn out to be a model 
which African governments feel more comfortable with, but it is a model not forced upon 
them. They are open to choose which model works best for them.  
5.4 Final Remarks and Further Research  
This thesis has assisted in enriching the comparative research on two very different actors in 
the aid architecture. They are in their own right representing two ends of the aid architecture. 
The thesis has tried, in its comparative approach, to present through a historical timeline, the 
developments of these two actors in their respective foreign aid architectures. There has been 
a lot of confusion related to China's impact on the aid architecture. It is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to give a full comparison of these two actors; but it has enriched the reader with the 
necessary information to construe how these two actors‟ fit into the broader aid architecture. 
The thesis has raised some critical questions regarding unconditional and conditional 
approaches to foreign aid. It has not been the aim to answer all of them, but rather bring to 
the fore, the fact that these are subjects need to be further researched.  This holds especially 
true with the emergence of the other BRICS and the implications on the aid architecture. 
There are a number of additional areas for further research. In particular, there is a lack of 
research on Chinese and multilateral aid cooperation. In 2004, China‟s offered to channel 
large parts of its emergency aid to the 2004 Tsunami relief efforts through the U.N. This 
marked a new hallmark in Chinese foreign aid, and has not received the necessary research it 
deserves. Questions that arise are whether this was a one-time only event, or  if China is 
willing to utilise multilateral organisations in future emergency relief. China‟s Eleventh Five 
Year Plan (2006-2010) clearly stipulates China‟s commitment to international co-operation. 
China has contributed USD 1 million to the new United Nations Central Emergency 
Response Fund (CERF) that was launched in 2006. China itself benefited from this Response 
Fund in the 2008 earthquake the country faced. What are the motivations and rationale 
behind the changes in this shift by China? Does this entail China taking a more responsible 
attitude as it grows in economic and military strength? This brings us to the main argument of 
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Brautigam that “Chinese aid is all about politics, symbolism, and soft power -- and not a 
simple swap-for-resources.”
294
 Are we seeing a peaceful rise, where China will focus on soft 
power instead of military such as USSR? This study brings us further to the topic of 
researching the primary motivations for giving foreign aid. There are two sides to the 
argument; where providing aid is mainly driven by self-interest pursuant of political and 
security interests. The other pole holds that providing aid is driven by idealism. 
There are a multitude of areas that could assist in better understanding Chinese foreign aid. 
Chinese foreign aid projects very rarely involve cash payments. Since the recipient never sees 
the money, does this dissuade ownership of foreign aid projects? A comparative of World 
Bank infrastructure (school, hospital, road etc.) versus Chinese foreign aid projects could 
assist to illuminate on this area. Ownership of foreign aid projects has been debated since the 
early 1990‟s and further pushed by the OECD in 1996.
 295
 The issue of ownership touches 
upon the sensitive topic of avoiding interfering in the internal affairs of a recipient country. A 
country study of the Chinese and World Bank foreign aid construction projects would greatly 
enrich the understanding and possibly find more efficient ways to assist recipients.   
Another area of research that has been overlooked is the impact Norwegian companies may 
be having compared to Chinese companies. A further comparative study on Norwegian and 
Chinese foreign aid could be into the impact of private companies from these two countries, 
which may be affecting the democratic institutions and worker rights. According to Petter 
Brubakk the Norwegian oil and Gas Company Statoil
296
 contributes more in annual tax 
income to Angola than Norway disburses in foreign aid to the entire African continent in the 
course of one year.
297
 Brubakk claims developing countries want investments and trade not 
foreign aid.
298
 What are the different approaches to work ethics and human rights of 
Norwegian and Chinese companies?  
There are multiple approaches to delivering foreign aid. The paper has not tried to evaluate 
which one is better. Rather, the objective has been to provide additional knowledge on this 
field, by comparing Norwegian and Chinese foreign aid. In particular, the study has further 
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